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I.   INTRODUCTION
 A fundamental precept of corporate law is that boards of “directors 
owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.”1 An 
equally fundamental precept of both contract law and mergers and 
acquisitions law is that parties to a definitive merger agreement are 
bound by the covenants in the agreement and must honor their com-
mitments.2 These two fundamental precepts can clash due to events 
arising after the signing of a definitive merger agreement but before
the transaction is completed. This Article addresses just such a clash: 
situations where a board of directors has a contractual commitment 
to recommend a transaction to its stockholders but where an event 
occurs after the signing of that agreement that would normally re-
quire a board, in honoring its fiduciary duties, to withdraw its earlier 
recommendation. This potential change in the board’s recommenda-
tion places the completion of a proposed transaction at risk and leads 
to deal instability.3 Although dealmakers are always cognizant of 
completion risk and generally use definitive agreements to distribute 
risks, the recent financial crisis has placed a renewed focus on  
completion risk.4
 Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) dealmakers have responded to 
completion risk in their own transactions, in part, by creating new 
                                                                                                                    
1.  See Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 
275 (2009) (recognizing that corporate law is based on the concept that boards of directors 
owe duties to the corporation and its stockholders).  
2.  See NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica Inc., Civil Action No. 2541-VCL, 2009 WL 
4981577, at *14 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2009) (recognizing “[i]t is critical” to enforce “bargained-
for rights” in merger agreements).  
 3.  Steven M. Haas, Limiting Change of Merger Recommendations to “Intervening 
Events,” 13 No. 8 M&A LAW. 15, 15 (Sept. 2009) (stating board’s ability to change recom-
mendation leads to “closing uncertainty”).  
4.  See Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse 
Termination Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568951 (recognizing use of acquisition 
agreement provisions to “mitigate, allocate or address” risks); William T. Allen, Under-
standing Fiduciary Outs: The What and the Why of an Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS. LAW.
653, 653 (2000) (stating economic function of contracts is to assign risks among parties); 
Robert A. Profusek, Rethinking Dealcraft, DEAL MAG., Sept. 11, 2009 (“Risk is, and for the 
foreseeable future, will remain, a four-letter word, especially in Washington and, more 
important, many corporate boardrooms.”); see also Steven M. Davidoff, The Deal Professor’s 
2009 in Review, Part I: No Exit, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 28, 2009, 12:16 PM), 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/the-deal-professors-2009-in-review-part-i-no-exit/ 
(predicting more bargaining over “completion risk” in 2010); Michael Weisser & Christo-
pher Machera, Another View: New Prism for Post-Crisis Deal Terms, N.Y. TIMES DEAL-
BOOK (Feb. 2, 2010, 11:05 AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/another-
view-new-prism-for-post-crisis-deal-terms/ (observing wake of financial crisis dealmakers 
are tailoring “ ‘deal specific’ solutions” while “weighing the impact of company, industry, 
market and deal specific considerations and scrutinizing the interplay between various 
provisions in the acquisition and related agreements”).  
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provisions or altering formerly standard provisions to control risk.5
As one practitioner has stated, “The recent meltdown of financial 
markets suggests that hundred- and thousand-year events with re-
levance to M&A may not be rare after all, and as seemingly improba-
ble risks occur with increasing frequency, some common assumptions 
about risk and some common provisions of M&A drafting may be ripe 
for re-examination.”6 Among these provisions now “ripe for re-
examination” are so-called “fiduciary outs.”7 Fiduciary outs within 
definitive acquisition agreements aim to relieve the tension between 
a board’s corporate law-imposed fiduciary duties, on the one hand, 
and the binding covenants of the acquisition agreement on the  
                                                                                                                    
5.  See Steven Davidoff, Wall Street’s Deal Factory Hits the Reset Button, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Sept. 17, 2009, 12:15 AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/17 
/wall-streets-deal-factory-hits-the-reset-button/ (“As they consider the transactions that 
failed . . . lawyers are likely to respond by shifting the details and structure of transactions, 
and with more explicit drafting and tighter ‘material adverse change’ clauses, which allow 
parties to walk away from a deal.”); Steven M. Davidoff, A New Approach to Deal Uncer-
tainty, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 27, 2009, 2:11 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2009/04/27/a-new-approach-to-deal-uncertainty/ (discussing novel transaction structures 
and twists on deal provisions); STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR: SHOTGUN TAKEOVERS,
GOVERNMENT BY DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION 301 (2009) (“[R]ecent event[s] 
have irrevocably changed our capital markets and the way deals are structured and com-
pleted. These coming changes, . . . and the unexpected events that will certainly occur, will 
make deal-making exciting both to watch and to participate in. It will result in more crea-
tivity in takeovers and a shift in deal-making profiles and structures, as lawyers and bank-
ers struggle to accommodate this new regime.”); David Fox & Daniel E. Wolf, Kirkland 
M&A Update, Deal Protection — One Size Does Not Fit All 1 (Nov. 10, 2009) 
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/3D29446470001AB502BE765735086773.pdf 
[hereinafter Fox & Wolf, Deal Protection] (“Since the collapse of the credit markets in 2007 
and with the emerging recovery, we have seen a noticeable trend toward ever tighter deal 
protection terms favoring buyers in many public merger agreements. While this trend is 
certainly not without exception, it does reflect a shift in perceived ‘market terms’ on many 
of these negotiated issues.”); see also Frank Aquila & Melissa Sawyer, A Series of Unfortu-
nate Events: How 2008 Changed M&A and What It Means for the Year Ahead, 12 No. 10 
M&A LAW. 8 (Nov./Dec. 2008) (“We may have to file away our standard forms and start 
borrowing techniques from other practice areas. From an intellectual perspective, 2009 will 
be an interesting and challenging year for deal lawyers, filled with opportunities for crea-
tivity.”).  
 6.  Rod J. Howard, Drafting for a Hundred-Year Storm, in DRAFTING CORPORATE 
AGREEMENTS 2009, at 181 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Grp., Course Handbook Series No. 
18055, 2009); see also Profusek, supra note 4 (advocating for a change in the way deals are 
done and stating, “It’s high time we stand back and completely revamp the basic terms of 
M&A papers, eliminating the boilerplate that is never relevant in the real world and ad-
vancing concepts that actually work when markets turn or expectations change.”). But see 
David Fox & Daniel E. Wolf, Kirkland M&A Update, Deal Certainty-The Fallacy of a New 
Market 1 (Oct. 2, 2009) http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/5696D46D316C86C 
CD29B502D2E02AF62.pdf (“[A]ny attempt to identify a simplified new paradigm or market 
for basic deal certainty terms is an overly simplistic view of the deal market in these early 
days of recovery—rather, we believe that the perceived departures from traditional deal 
structures are largely a reflection of a complex equation of a dozen or so contractual variables 
that interact with overall deal dynamics, including company-specific and secular market con-
ditions, to produce a deal-specific outcome in the relevant post-crash transactions.”). 
7.  See Howard, supra note 6, at 196 (“Rapidly changing circumstances put new 
stress on ‘fiduciary out’ clauses, raising questions both for acquirers and targets . . . .”). 
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other.8 More specifically, these contractual provisions permit the tar-
get (and sometimes the acquirer) to take an action that the agree-
ment otherwise prohibits, or to not perform an action that the 
agreement requires, provided such action or inaction is required to 
prevent a breach of the board’s fiduciary duties.9
 Although a public company merger agreement generally contains 
a number of “fiduciary outs,” the fiduciary out that is most relevant 
to changes in the financial condition of one or both of the merger par-
ties is the “merger recommendation fiduciary out.”10 The need for a 
merger recommendation fiduciary out arises from the M&A transac-
tion process and the stockholder approvals required in M&A transac-
tions. Under Delaware law,11 when a board of directors adopts a mer-
ger agreement, the board must recommend the transaction to its 
stockholders.12 Before submitting the agreement to the stockholders 
for a vote, the board must either reaffirm its recommendation or 
withdraw its recommendation.13 A merger recommendation fiduciary 
out allows the board to withdraw or modify its recommendation of a 
transaction despite a contractual obligation to recommend the trans-
action. The negotiation and specific drafting of this fiduciary out de-
termines whether a board of directors can withdraw or modify its 
recommendation between the time of adoption and signing of the 
merger agreement and the time of the stockholders’ approval. Some 
versions of the out permit a board to withdraw its recommendation 
anytime a failure to do so would otherwise breach its fiduciary du-
                                                                                                                    
8.  See William T. Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and the Why of 
an Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS. LAW. 653, 655-56 (2000) (describing the use of fiduciary 
outs to bridge the gap between corporate law fiduciary duties and contract law); see also 
Celia R. Taylor, “A Delicate Interplay”: Resolving the Contract and Corporate Law Tension 
in Mergers, 74 TUL. L. REV. 561, 615 n.346 (1999) (recognizing fiduciary out allows direc-
tors to pursue alternative course from contract if fiduciary duties so require).
 9.  Christina M. Sautter, Shopping During Extended Store Hours: From No Shops to 
Go-Shops- The Development, Effectiveness, and Implications of Go-Shop Provisions in 
Change of Control Transactions, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 525, 535 (2008).
10. See John F. Johnston & Frederick H. Alexander, Fiduciary Outs and Exclusive 
Merger Agreements—Delaware Law and Practice, INSIGHTS: THE CORPORATE & SECURITIES
LAW ADVISOR, Vol. 11 No. 2, Feb. 1997, at 19 n.2 (describing various fiduciary outs appear-
ing in typical merger agreement).  
 11. The focus of this Article is on Delaware law due to Delaware’s domination of the 
public company charter market and its well-developed body of case law in the mergers and 
acquisitions arena. As of 2009, 63% of Fortune 500 companies were incorporated in the 
state. 2009 DELAWARE DIV. OF CORPS. ANN. REP. 1, http://corp.delaware.gov/2009ar.pdf. 
Over half of the publicly traded U.S. companies are incorporated in Delaware. Dep’t of 
State: Div. of Corps., About Agency, http://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last vi-
sited  Oct. 18, 2010). Moreover, a recent study of 1,020 public company merger agreements 
announced between 2004 and 2008 revealed that Delaware law was the governing law for 
66.4% of those agreements. Matthew Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive 
Reach, 4 (Jan. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431625.  
12. See infra Part II.A. 
13. See infra Part II.A.
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ties.14 Some boards, however, agree to a narrower out providing that 
the board may withdraw its recommendation only when there is a 
Superior Offer,15 as that term is defined in the merger agreement.16
 More recently, parties have adopted the practice of negotiating a 
variation on these two basic types of merger recommendation fidu-
ciary outs.17 This variation allows a board to withdraw its recommen-
dation either when there is a Superior Offer or when there has been 
an Intervening Event.18 An Intervening Event is often defined as an 
event that the board was not aware of or could not have reasonably 
foreseen at the time of signing.19 Such contractual limitations on the 
board’s ability to change its recommendation have revived the debate 
as to whether a board may limit by contract the fiduciary duties 
mandated by state law.20
 More specifically, recent discussion centers on the validity of con-
tractual limitations of fiduciary duties in the context of merger rec-
ommendations—an issue that the Delaware courts have yet to fully 
address.21 Most of the jurisprudence regarding fiduciary outs has fo-
cused on fiduciary outs in the context of no shop provisions, by which 
target boards agree not to solicit third-party offers after signing a 
                                                                                                                    
14. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 15. The terms Superior Offer and Superior Proposal will be used interchangeably in 
this article. These terms appear in capitalized form because they are defined terms in a 
merger agreement.  
16. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
17. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 18. Like Superior Offers and Superior Proposals, the term Intervening Event appears 
in capitalized form because it is a defined term in a merger agreement.  
 19. The definition of an Intervening Event varies among agreements such that a cer-
tain event may trigger one Intervening Event out but may not trigger another, differently 
defined Intervening Event out. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
20. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Deal Lawyers Are Getting Creative, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Apr. 14, 2009, 2:23 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/deal-
lawyers-start-getting-creative/ [hereinafter Davidoff, Getting Creative] (discussing recent 
transactions in which boards have agreed to contractually limit their merger recommenda-
tion fiduciary out and describing the discussion between Vice Chancellor Strine of Dela-
ware Chancery Court and Simpson Thacher & Bartlett partner, Rob Spatt, regarding the 
validity of such limitations); Haas, supra note 3, at 15 (discussing the trend in merger 
agreements of allowing boards to change their recommendations in favor of the deal due to 
Intervening Events); Fiduciary Outs for Intervening Events: Are They Necessary?, M&A
LITIGATION COMMENTARY (July 11, 2009, 2:46 PM), http://mandalitigationcommentary.
blogspot.com/2009/07/fiduciary-outs-for-intervening-events.html. 
21. See Steven M. Davidoff, Deal Failures: The Second Wave, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(Nov. 6, 2008, 1:37 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/deal-failures-the-
second-wave/ [hereinafter Davidoff, Deal Failures] (“There is little Delaware case law on 
when a board can change its recommendation, but a Delaware board is allowed to do this 
(indeed must) if it determines that the acquisition is no longer in the best interests of [the 
target’s] shareholders. And since it is within the board’s discretion, it is a hard thing for 
[the acquirer] to challenge legally.”); John F. Johnston, A Rubeophobic Delaware Counsel 
Marks Up Fiduciary-Out Forms: Part II, 14 INSIGHTS: THE CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR 2, 16, 
17 (2000) (eluding to the limited case law on merger recommendation outs).  
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merger agreement.22 Consequently, a majority of the scholarly and 
practitioner commentary also focuses on fiduciary outs in the context 
of no shop provisions and whether boards may contractually limit 
that fiduciary out.23 To date, the Delaware courts have never directly 
addressed the validity of provisions limiting merger recommendation 
fiduciary outs to Superior Offers and/or Intervening Events. In addi-
tion, there has been minimal commentary, particularly in recent 
years, that focuses on the merger recommendation fiduciary out.24
This recent lack of commentary is somewhat surprising considering 
the emergence of the Intervening Event language as well as recent 
transactions in which boards have chosen to exercise their right to 
withdraw recommendations due to a change in circumstances be-
tween signing and closing.25
 This Article is designed to fill the void in recent academic com-
mentary relating to the merger recommendation fiduciary out. It 
breaks new ground in arguing that a board of directors may agree to 
contractually limit its fiduciary duties in the context of the merger 
recommendation fiduciary out. Part II of this Article explores the 
merger adoption and recommendation process and describes the pe-
riod between signing and closing, including the risks inherent in the 
period that may trigger the merger recommendation fiduciary out. In 
addition, this Part provides an overview of the board’s fiduciary du-
ties during the merger process. Part III examines jurisprudence re-
lating to fiduciary outs generally, which sets the background upon 
which merger recommendation fiduciary outs must be interpreted. 
Part IV discusses recent trends in the drafting of merger recommen-
dation fiduciary outs, including the differences among the outs, and 
describes events that would trigger a board’s duty to withdraw its 
recommendation under each type of out. Furthermore, this section 
describes recent, rare examples of transactions in which boards of 
directors have withdrawn their recommendations due to events other 
                                                                                                                    
 22. For a discussion of Delaware case law regarding the no shop fiduciary out, see 
infra Part III.  
23. See, e.g., John F. Johnston et al., Delaware Chancery Court Rulings on Fiduciary-
Outs (Feb. 5, 1999), http://www.mnat.com/assets/attachments/21.pdf; John F. Johnston, 
Recent Amendments to the Merger Sections of the DGCL Will Eliminate Some—But Not 
All—Fiduciary Out Negotiation and Drafting Issues, 1 BNA: MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS L.
REP. 777 (July 20, 1998); Johnston & Alexander, supra note 10, at 18-19. 
 24. Examples of recent commentary include: Haas, supra note 3; Fiduciary Outs for 
Intervening Events: Are They Necessary?, supra note 20. Examples of older commentary in-
clude: R. Franklin Balotti & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Deal-Protection Measures and the Merger 
Recommendation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 467 (2002) (analyzing contractual limitations on board’s 
recommendation out); A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Merger Agreements Under Delaware Law—
When Can Directors Change Their Minds?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 815 (1997) (discussing merger 
recommendations prior to Delaware’s allowance of force-the-vote provisions). 
 25. For a further discussion of the types of merger recommendation fiduciary outs as 
well as examples of transactions where boards have withdrawn their recommendations, see 
infra Part IV.  
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than the receipt of a Superior Offer. Part V argues that a board of 
directors may agree to certain limitations on its merger recommenda-
tion fiduciary out. A board that has complied with its fiduciary duties 
at the time that it enters into a merger agreement should be aware of 
most events that could reasonably occur during the period between 
signing and closing. Thus, the board can take these events into ac-
count during negotiations and structure the transaction to ade-
quately address these possible changed circumstances. This Part fur-
ther argues that termination fees should be structured so that the fee 
varies based on the event triggering the recommendation withdraw-
al. Finally, this Part addresses provisions that explicitly allow the 
board to comply with its duty of disclosure without changing its rec-
ommendation. This Article argues that such provisions enable the 
board to comply with its fiduciary duty of disclosure, allow the board 
to abide by the merger recommendation covenant, and still permit 
the stockholders to make an informed vote for or against the  
proposed merger. 
II.   OVERVIEW OF THE TRANSACTION PROCESS
A.   Adoption of the Merger Agreement & Board Recommendation 
The target board of directors’ obligation to adopt and recommend a 
merger agreement is long-recognized under Delaware law. Under 
Section 251(b) of the Delaware General Corporations Law (DGCL), 
prior to executing a merger agreement the board of directors of each 
company must adopt a board resolution approving, and declaring the 
advisability of, the merger agreement.26 Declaring the advisability of 
the merger is what is known as the board’s recommendation to the 
stockholders.27 In reviewing whether a target board has made an in-
formed decision in adopting the agreement and declaring the advisa-
bility of the merger, courts will consider only “the information then
reasonably available to the directors and relevant to their decision to 
                                                                                                                    
26. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (2010) (describing the procedure for the board’s 
adoption of the merger agreement). In 1998, Section 251 was amended to include the “advi-
sability” language that now exists in Section 251(b). S.B. 311, 71st Leg. 139th Gen. Assem., 
2d Sess. (Del. 1998); see also Balotti & Sparks, supra note 24, at 473 (describing the 
amendments to Section 251(b)). 
27. See Michael A. Stanchfield, Voting Lock-ups Sales of Partially Owned Subsidiar-
ies: Can Stockholders Love a Deal Too Early and Too Much?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1325, 1329-30 (2002) (describing the recommendation process).  
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accept the . . . merger proposal.”28 Once the board of directors adopts 
the merger agreement, the agreement may then be executed.29
 Following the board’s adoption of the merger agreement and its 
subsequent execution, the agreement must be submitted to the 
stockholders of each corporation for a vote.30 For the reasons dis-
cussed in Part II.B, there is usually a lengthy period between the ex-
ecution of the merger agreement and the stockholders’ meeting at 
which the stockholders vote on the merger.31 When the company 
sends out the proxy statement for the stockholders’ meeting, the 
board of directors is expected to include the advisability of the merger 
in the proxy statement.32
 Until 1998, a board of directors could not submit a merger agree-
ment to its stockholders without affirmatively recommending the 
merger.33 However, in 1998, Section 251(c) was amended to allow for 
an agreement to be submitted to the stockholders for a vote even if 
the board determines that “the agreement is no longer advisable and 
recommends that the stockholders reject it.”34 In 2003, this provision 
                                                                                                                    
 28. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (emphasis added). If the 
board had not made an informed decision at the board meeting adopting the merger 
agreement, then the next inquiry is whether the directors’ subsequent actions were suffi-
cient to alleviate any issues with its previous decision. See id. (stating that whether the 
board made an informed business judgment to sell company involved a two-part analysis—
first, looking at the board’s decision at the meeting adopting the agreement and then look-
ing at any subsequent actions to cure any problems in the initial meeting).  
29. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (2010) (describing the procedure for the board’s 
adoption of the merger agreement).  
30. See id. § 251(c) (describing the procedure for the stockholders’ adoption or rejec-
tion of the merger agreement).  
31. See infra Part II.B. 
 32. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1012 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (2010); see also Fron-
tier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. Civ. A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027, at *27 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 
2005) (stating that target directors have “continuing fiduciary duties to the shareholders to 
evaluate the proposed transaction”).  
33. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 888 (stating that under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
251(b) as that section was then drafted, the board could not recommend that stockholders 
vote against the merger without rescinding the agreement, withdrawing its approval, and 
cancelling the stockholders’ meeting); Dennis J. Block, Public Company M&A: Directors’ 
Fiduciary Duties and Recent Developments in Corporate Control Transactions, in CON-
TESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 2009: CURRENT OFFENSIVE & DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES IN 
M&A TRANSACTIONS, at 87 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 22685, 
2009) (stating that prior to the 1998 amendments, boards had to affirmatively recommend 
mergers before they could go to shareholder votes).  
 34. S.B. 311, 71st Leg. 139th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Del. 1998). This language com-
bined with the “declaring advisability” language in Section 251(b) makes it unambiguous 
that the board must make the determination in the beginning that the transaction is in the 
best interests of the stockholders. See Johnston et al., supra note 23 (stating that 1998 
amendments to Section 251 make clear that board must declare agreement “advisable” 
from outset). These amendments to Section 251 were prompted by: 
(i) Van Gorkom's holding that a board of directors must recommend a merger to 
stockholders in order for it to be presented to stockholders, (ii) the view that be-
cause directors owe fiduciary duties to stockholders they must be able to 
change their minds prior to a stockholder vote and to recommend against a 
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was removed from Section 251(c) and now appears in Section 146 of 
the DGCL as the following: “A corporation may agree to submit a 
matter to a vote of its stockholders whether or not the board of direc-
tors determines at any time subsequent to approving such matter 
that such matter is no longer advisable and recommends that the 
stockholders reject or vote against the matter.”35 These amendments 
to the DGCL permit what is known in practice as a “force-the-vote” 
provision to be included in the merger agreement.36 That is, the 
agreement may provide that even if the board of directors has with-
drawn its recommendation of a merger, the board is still obligated to 
submit the agreement to the stockholders for a vote.  
B.   Preclosing Period 
To appreciate the role of merger recommendation fiduciary outs 
(hereinafter, “recommendation outs”) in M&A, it is essential to first 
understand that, in the vast majority of public company acquisitions, 
there is an often rather lengthy delay between the execution of a de-
finitive acquisition agreement and the closing of that transaction 
(when the stock or assets are transferred and the purchase price is 
paid).37 In practice, this interim period is typically called the “preclos-
ing period” or the “postsigning period.”38 The preclosing period exists 
for several reasons—the most significant of which are the need to ob-
tain stockholder approval and antitrust clearance. 
1.   Source of the Delay—Conditions Precedent 
  a.   Stockholder Approval 
 First, and foremost, because most large, public transactions are 
structured as statutory mergers, stockholder approval may be re-
quired under state law.39 Under Delaware law, the target stockhold-
                                                                                                                    
merger if appropriate, and (iii) the business reality that some merger partners 
will not enter into a merger agreement which is not binding except for the 
stockholder approval requirement . . . .  
Balotti & Sparks, supra note 24, at 473. 
 35. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 146 (2010).  
36. See Block, supra note 33, at 87 (stating that allowing board to submit merger to 
stockholders even when board has withdrawn its support is known as a force-the-vote deal).  
37. See JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER § 5.2.2 (1975) (stating that most 
significant acquisitions do not simultaneously sign and close but instead have delays be-
tween the execution of the definitive acquisition agreement and the final closing); see also 
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skill and Asset Pricing, 94 
YALE L.J. 239, 260 n.55 (1984) (describing investigation and other nonregulatory reasons 
for a delay between the execution of the agreement and the closing of the transaction).
 38. Throughout this Article the interim period will be referred to as the  
“preclosing period.” 
39. See Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Though MAC 
Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2017 (2009) 
(stating that the “most fundamental reason” for the preclosing period is that public compa-
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ers must approve the merger.40 Whether the acquiring corporation’s 
stockholder approval is needed depends on the structure of the deal.41
If the merger does not change the articles of incorporation or out-
standing stock, as in a tender offer, the acquirer’s stockholders need 
not approve the merger.42 However, if the merger involves stock as 
consideration, usually the acquirer’s stockholders must also approve 
the transaction because voting power may be altered.43
 Obtaining stockholder approval requires time to organize and ex-
ecute. First, a meeting must be called for the purpose of approving the 
transaction.44 Notice must be sent to the stockholders at least twenty 
calendar days prior to the meeting date, or at least twenty days be-
fore action can be taken.45 Proxy solicitations must be prepared and 
distributed to stockholders in advance of the meeting. These proxy 
materials must include a proxy statement and must be filed with the 
SEC.46 A preliminary statement must be filed at least ten days before 
the date solicitations are sent or given to the stockholders.47 The final 
copy of the proxy statement must be filed with the SEC as of the date 
proxies are sent to the stockholders.48 Schedule 14A enumerates the 
requirements of the proxy statement, and includes, among other 
things, a financial statement, terms of the merger transaction, and 
appraisal rights.49 It also requires a summary term sheet, which is 
governed by Regulation S-K, subpart Regulation M-A, which man-
dates a plain English summary term sheet.50 Pursuant to both Dela-
                                                                                                                    
nies’ transactions are “invariably structured as statutory mergers, and the corporate laws 
of all states require that the shareholders of the corporations engaging in a statutory mer-
ger approve the transaction.”); see also John C. Coates, IV, The Powerful and Pervasive 
Effects of Ownership on M&A, 26 (Jan. 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1544500 (presenting the results of a statistical study of public and 
private company merger agreements and stating that the vast majority of public company 
deals are structured as one-step mergers); Lou R. Kling et al., Summary of Acquisition 
Agreements, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779, 781 (1997) (explaining that the seller’s, and some-
times the buyer’s, stockholder approval may lead to delayed performance).  
 40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, §251(b). 
 41. Short form and triangular mergers typically do not require acquirer corporate share-
holder approval. Note that stock exchange rules may require shareholder approval as well. 
 42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 251(f). 
 43. Id.
 44. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 - 240.14b-2 (2010). 
 45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2(b) (2010). Generally, in the past, once the SEC cleared the 
proxy materials, the stockholders’ meeting would be held within a month and the closing 
would occur shortly thereafter. See Peter S. Golden et al., Negotiated Cash Acquisitions of 
Public Companies in Uncertain Time, 13 No. 2 M&A LAW. 1 (Feb. 2009) (describing past 
practices with respect to the timing of the stockholders’ meeting and the closing and stat-
ing that absent regulatory issues or buyer’s right to delay closing to finalize financing, 
closing typically would occur shortly after the stockholders’ meeting). 
46. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (2010). 
 47. Id.
48. Id. 
 49. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2010). 
 50. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1012 (2010).  
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ware state law51 and Regulation M-A, the summary term sheet por-
tion of the proxy statement must include a statement by the board of 
directors, which offers the board’s recommendation as to the advisa-
bility of the transaction.52 Furthermore, the SEC regulations require 
a statement of the reasons for taking this position by the board.53 In 
addition, under Delaware law the board has a “well-established” duty 
of disclosure that “represents nothing more than the well-recognized 
proposition that directors of Delaware corporations are under a fidu-
ciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material information within 
the board’s control when it seeks shareholder action.”54
 This duty of disclosure also arises in the context of tender offers, 
which are regulated by Regulation 14D.55 Under Regulation 14D, 
Rule 14d-9 requires that the board of directors for the corporation 
that is the target of a tender offer take a position regarding the of-
fer.56 The target must file Schedule 14D in conjunction with this rec-
ommendation.57 Furthermore, Regulation 14E contains additional 
rules regarding tender offers, and imposes requirements for disclo-
sure procedures. Under Rule 14e-1, tender offers must be open for at 
least twenty business days.58 Under Rule 14e-2, once the tender offer 
is first published or sent, the target company must provide stock-
holders a statement no later than ten business days, with a recom-
mendation of whether to accept or reject the offer, a statement of 
neutrality, or a statement of inability to take a position; if no position 
is taken, the board must articulate the reason why it is not.59 Fur-
thermore, if any material changes occur, this information must be 
promptly given to stockholders.60
  b.   Regulatory Approvals 
 In addition to stockholder approvals, certain regulatory filings and 
                                                                                                                    
 51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251(b); see also ODS Techs., L.P. v. Marshall, 832 A.2d 
1254, 1261 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“Delaware law requires a full and fair explanation of the ratio-
nale for a proposal that directors are recommending stockholders to approve.”).  
 52. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1012. The SEC, in proposing this requirement, explained, “As for mer-
ger proxy statements, we believe a summary term sheet should provide . . . the board’s recom-
mendation on how to vote or their position regarding the transaction . . . .” Regulation of Ta-
keovers and Security Holder Communications, 64 Fed. Reg. 61408, 61423 (Nov. 10, 1999). 
 53. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1012(b) (2010). 
 54. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992). See generally Lloyd L. Drury III, 
Private Equity and the Heightened Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure, 6 N.Y.U. J. LAW & BUS. 33 
(2010) (discussing heightened duty of disclosure).  
 55. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1 - 240.14d-101 (2010). 
 56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (2010). 
57. Id. 
 58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (2010). 
 59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2(a) (2010). 
 60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2(b) (2010). 
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approvals may be necessary.61 For example, if either the acquirer or 
target are engaged in U.S. commerce, or in activities effecting U.S. 
commerce, and if the proposed acquisition or parties meet certain 
size tests, premerger notification filing may be required under the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (Hart-Scott-
Rodino)62 with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ).63 In order to file pre-
merger notification under Hart-Scott-Rodino, a definitive acquisition 
agreement or letter of intent must have been executed.64 This re-
quirement, combined with the fact that the size tests are relatively 
easy to meet, result in most transactions being subject to Hart-Scott-
Rodino filing. Therefore, most transactions cannot simultaneously 
sign and close.65 Once premerger notification is filed with the FTC 
and the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust De-
partment of the DOJ, a waiting period commences during which time 
closing may not occur.66 This waiting period is typically thirty days 
                                                                                                                    
61. See LOU R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPA-
NIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS § 1.04[1] (2009) (detailing antitrust and other regulato-
ry filings that may be required); see also Miller, supra note 39, at 2020-23. In addition to 
the antitrust filings described in this section, if a foreign investor is involved in the acquisi-
tion of a U.S. company, a filing with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS) may be required. SIMON M. LORNE & JOY MARLENE BRYAN, ACQUISITIONS 
AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED AND CONTESTED TRANSACTIONS § 8:4 (2010). The Exon-Florio 
Amendment to Title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950 gives the President of the 
United States authority to suspend or prohibit the acquisition of a U.S. business by a for-
eign investor under two conditions. Id. First, the President must find that there is credible 
evidence that the foreign investor might take action that threatens national security. Id.
Second, existing laws, besides the Exon-Florio provision and the International Economic 
Powers Act, do not provide adequate authority to protect national security. Id. While the 
President retains the sole power to prohibit or suspend a transaction under this provision, 
CFIUS implements the Exon-Florio Amendment. Id. CFIUS customarily receives notice of 
a transaction whereby a foreign investor is acquiring a U.S. company either by a transact-
ing party or by a CFIUS member agency. Id. After receipt of notice, CFIUS reviews the 
transaction verifying whether the transaction will trigger the necessary conditions in the 
provision and gives the President a recommendation. Id. Thereafter, a transaction may 
either be suspended or prohibited. Id.
 62. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006) 
[hereinafter “Hart-Scott-Rodino”].  
63. See id. See also MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREE-
ZEOUTS §§ 7.02[1][c], [d] (2009) (summarizing size and commerce tests under Hart-Scott-
Rodino); Miller, supra note 39, at 2020-21 (describing Hart-Scott-Rodino filing require-
ments). The thresholds for the size tests change each fiscal year depending on the gross 
national product for that fiscal year. See Hart-Scott-Rodino, § 18(a)(2)(A) (describing ad-
justments made to thresholds for each fiscal year as a percentage change from gross na-
tional product for fiscal year ending September 30, 2003).  
64. See KLING & NUGENT, supra note 61, § 5.04[1] (stating that execution of definitive 
agreement or letter of intent is precondition to Hart-Scott-Rodino filing).  
65. See Miller, supra note 39, at 2021 (stating that “[b]ecause the relevant thresholds 
are quite low, all but the smallest acquisitions require approval under the [Hart-Scott-
Rodino] Act” so there must be delayed closing).  
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a), (b)(1)(A) (2006) (stating that voting securities or assets 
may not be transferred until waiting period expires and describing when waiting  
period commences). 
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(or fifteen days for cash tender offers) and may be extended further if 
the FTC or DOJ make a second request for information.67
  c.   Third Party Consents 
 In addition to stockholder approval and antitrust clearances, of-
tentimes third-party consents may be required.68 These third-party 
consents arise because the target, and sometimes the acquirer are 
already parties to agreements that may limit their ability to under-
take a change of control transaction.69 For example, consent may be 
needed from the lessor of real property or equipment that the target 
leases, from the mortgagee of the target’s property, or from other 
third parties with whom the target has entered into a contract.70 Par-
ties often wait until the preclosing period to obtain consent for the 
transaction from third parties.71 As a result of the time necessary to 
accomplish these tasks the preclosing period can extend anywhere 
from a month to several months and, in some cases, can last up to  
a year.72
                                                                                                                    
 67. Id. § 18a(b), (e)(2).
68. See FREUND, supra note 37, § 12.3.2 (addressing process for third-party consents 
during preclosing period). Other regulatory consents, besides antitrust and third-party 
consents, are often required by the regulatory agency supervising a particular industry. 
For example, “a merger between banks may require the approval of the Federal Reserve[; 
a] merger between communications companies may require the approval of the Federal 
Communications Commission[; and] . . . a merger between airlines may require the ap-
proval of the Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of Transportation.” 
Miller, supra note 39, at 2021-22.
69. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The Unique Benefits of Treating Personal Goodwill as 
Property in Corporate Acquisitions, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 n.165 (2005) (stating if agree-
ments contain change of control provisions consent may be required).  
70. See FREUND, supra note 37, § 12.3.2 (providing examples of third-party consents).  
71. See id. (stating that, except in circumstances involving a “crucial matter,” obtain-
ing third-party consents is usually done after signing). 
72. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in Nego-
tiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 241 (1990) (explaining there is gener-
ally two to four months between signing and closing); John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subra-
manian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 
310 (2000) (stating that time required to obtain stockholder approval ranges from a mini-
mum of thirty days to up to six months); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding 
MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 333-34 (2005) (stating 
that preclosing period typically lasts from ninety days up to a year); Jessica Silver-
Greenberg, Dealmakers Tiptoe Back into the M&A Market, BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 18, 2009) 
(stating average deal now takes sixty days to close). Due to the recent volatility in the fi-
nancial markets, deal makers may attempt to shorten this period. For example, some prac-
titioners foresee that there will be increased demands on deal lawyers “to get proxy state-
ments and regulatory applications filed within days, rather than weeks, of announcing 
transactions.” Frank Aquila & Melissa Sawyer, A Series of Unfortunate Events: How 2008 
Changed M&A and What It Means for the Year Ahead, 12 NO. 10 M&A LAW. 8 (Nov./Dec. 
2008). Moreover, the same practitioners suggest that regulatory lawyers may be asked to 
structure deals so that regulatory approvals are not needed or “to avoid second requests and 
other extended waiting periods.” Id. It appears that these methods may be working as the 
average time to close deals has decreased from 130 days to 60 days. Silver-Greenberg, supra.
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2.   Consequences of the Delay 
 During this month to year-long preclosing period, parties to an 
agreement face a number of potential changes in circumstances or 
risks that the parties try to limit contractually. The first risk is that 
a third party may attempt to interrupt, or “jump,” the proposed 
transaction by submitting a better offer.73 The possibility of a third 
party’s later offer is viewed as a risk by most acquirers who, by the 
preclosing period, have likely devoted a substantial amount of re-
sources, financial and otherwise, to the proposed transaction.74 Con-
versely, target company boards may have varying reactions to a third 
party’s offer depending on the nature of the offer, the identity of the 
third party, and, sometimes on management’s personal goals.75
 Risks faced by parties during the preclosing period are not limited 
to topping bids made by third parties. An additional and perhaps 
more prevalent risk in today’s unstable economic environment is the 
risk there will be adverse changes in the financial markets or in the 
business or industries of the acquirer or target. In these situations, 
although there may arguably be a material adverse change, the party 
often will not want or be able to escape the agreement by invoking 
the material adverse effect clause.76 However, a board may not want 
                                                                                                                    
73. See Block, supra note 33, at 74 (recognizing the possibility that a third-party may 
make superior offer after signing).  
74. See id. (stating merger agreements typically contain protective measures like no 
shop provision designed to reduce possibility of later offer); Kling et al., supra note 39, at 
798 (stating buyers try to minimize “ ‘competitor risk’ ” and seek to complete transactions 
“without the constant threat of interference from a competitor which may overbid his price 
or undercut his other contract demands by taking positions which are more palatable to 
the seller . . . .”).  
75. See In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 72-73 (Del. Ch. 2007) (stating board 
of directors purportedly rejected third party’s unsolicited offer due to antitrust risks); Sean J. 
Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An Appraisal of Omnicare v. NCS Health-
care, 29 J. CORP. L. 569, 615-16 (2004) (describing the possibility that boards and managers 
may favor an initial merger over a third-party offer due to their own interests).  
76. See Symposium, Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies, 10 U. MIAMI BUS.
L. REV. 219, 259-60 (2002) (remarks made by Lou Kling) [hereinafter Negotiating Acquisi-
tions]. In a 2002 symposium, Skadden Arps M&A partner Lou Kling addressed this type of 
scenario by stating:  
You can have a situation where the exchange ratio in the merger is fixed, and 
there's been an adverse change in the acquiring company’s business that really 
drives down the dollar value of the deal to the target's stockholders, who will be 
receiving stock of the acquirer in the merger. As the target’s counsel you may 
not feel sufficiently comfortable that this is actually a material adverse change 
for purposes of triggering a walk right, and your client may not wish to take the 
liability risk of declaring a MAC and walking. At the same time, the board may 
no longer believe the deal as originally priced makes sense. That’s a perfect ex-
ample of a situation where I would find it very hard to tell a board of directors, 
Even though you don’t believe in this deal any more, you have to mail out a 
proxy statement that says you’re still recommending it. I don’t even know how 
you get up and say that to the board and expect to get hired again . . . . If they 
don't believe in it, they don’t believe in it. 
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to continue to recommend the deal due to adverse changes.77
 Yet another change that may occur after signing is one found in 
many a law school hypothetical. That is, the possibility that the tar-
get may increase substantially in value due to an unforeseen positive 
event—anything from the discovery of gold or oil on the target’s 
property or, more likely, an event such as the discovery that the tar-
get has patent rights in a certain product.78 A target board’s response 
to each of these risks, or opportunities, is governed by the merger 
agreement’s various fiduciary outs, including the recommendation 
out and other related merger agreement provisions. 
C.   Fiduciary Duties of the Target Board in Mergers and Acquisitions
 Generally, courts review a board’s business decisions, including a 
decision to engage in a merger or acquisition, using the deferential 
business judgment rule.79 The business judgment rule is a “presump-
tion that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation 
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”80 Howev-
er, depending on the transaction structure at issue additional stan-
dards of review may be applicable before the business judgment rule 
is applied.81 The most prominent of these merger-specific duties are 
the duty to get the best price once the board decides to sell, and the 
duty to act reasonably when adopting defensive mechanisms.  
 In 1986, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Revlon v. MacAndrews 
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., held that once the break-up of a company 
becomes inevitable, the board’s “role change[s] from defenders of the 
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price 
                                                                                                                    
Id.
77. Id.
78. See Balotti & Sparks, supra note 24 at 468; Block, supra note 33, at 83 (discussing 
situations where target board may decide to change its recommendation due to positive 
event like the discovery of patent rights); see also Stanchfield, supra note 27, at 1330 n.5 
(listing changed conditions such as “changes in market conditions (including the parties’ 
stock prices), litigation, [and] new product developments . . . .”).
79. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 928 (Del. 2003) (de-
scribing deferential nature of business judgment rule). A board’s fiduciary duties apply in 
the M&A setting during the negotiation and sale process and continue to apply after the 
execution of a definitive acquisition agreement. See id. at 938 (recognizing the “continuing 
obligation [of directors] to discharge their fiduciary responsibilities, as future circums-
tances develop, after a merger agreement is announced”).  
 80. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). When this standard is applied, 
the party challenging the board’s actions has the burden of rebutting the presumption. Id. 
If the presumption is not rebutted then “a court will not substitute its judgment for that of 
the board if the [board’s] decision can be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.’ ” 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (quoting Sinclair Oil 
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)). 
 81. Revlon Corp. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
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for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”82 As a result, courts 
apply an enhanced scrutiny standard to make certain the board has 
acted reasonably in maximizing stockholder value.83
 Although it is unclear exactly when Revlon applies, it is clear from 
the jurisprudence that an all-cash transaction results in a change of 
control and thus triggers Revlon.84 On the other end of the spectrum, 
most stock-for-stock transactions will not trigger Revlon duties. In-
stead, in reviewing the board’s decision to enter into a stock-for-stock 
transaction, courts will defer to the board’s business judgment.85
However, Revlon duties may be triggered in a stock-for-stock transac-
tion if one person or entity will acquire a controlling block of stock so 
that the target company’s stockholders become minority stockholders 
in the surviving corporation.86 When a transaction involves a mix of 
cash and stock uncertainty lingers as to exactly when Revlon may be 
triggered.87 Delaware courts have held that when 33% of the consid-
eration is cash Revlon is not triggered, while a transaction involving 
62% cash would likely trigger Revlon and thus would be subject to 
that higher level of scrutiny.88 However, where the courts will draw 
the line between 33% and 62% has yet to be seen.89
 Another consideration is the applicable standard of review govern-
ing deal protection provisions, including the merger recommendation 
covenant. Specifically, the debate among jurists, scholars, and practi-
tioners has centered on whether deal protection provisions in nego-
                                                                                                                    
82. Id. at 182. 
83. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) 
(applying the enhanced scrutiny standard in reviewing board of directors’ fiduciary duties 
in a sale of control context).
84. See In re NYMEX S’holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 3621-VCN, 3835-VCN, 2009 WL 
3206051, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2009) (“[I]n a transaction where cash is the exclusive 
consideration paid to the acquired corporation's shareholders, a fundamental change of 
corporate control occurs—thereby triggering Revlon—because control of the corporation 
does not continue in a large, fluid market.”).
85. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 571 
A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del. 1989) (reviewing stock-for-stock transaction to determine whether it 
“was the product of a proper exercise of business judgment”).
86. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d at 42-43.  
87. See Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1997) 
(“How this ‘change in control’ trigger works in instances of mixed cash and stock or other 
paper awaits future cases.”); see also NYMEX, 2009 WL 3206051, at *5 (recognizing uncer-
tainty involved when a merger consideration that is a mix of cash and stock, and recogniz-
ing the amount of cash needed to trigger Revlon is uncertain).
88. See In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 70-71 (Del. 1995) (hold-
ing deal in which cash accounted for 33% of consideration did not trigger Revlon); In re 
Lukens Inc. S’holder Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 732 n.25 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating deal in which 
cash accounted for 62% of consideration likely triggers Revlon).
 89. Brian J.M. Quinn, Triggering Revlon Duties, M&A LAW PROF BLOG (Oct. 15, 
2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2009/10/triggering-revlon-duties.html 
(recognizing uncertainty of how much cash is needed to trigger Revlon); NYMEX, 2009 WL 
3206051, at *5 (recognizing uncertainty involved when consideration is a mix of cash and 
stock, and recognizing that the amount of cash needed to trigger Revlon is uncertain). 
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tiated transactions should be reviewed under the deferential business 
judgment rule or whether the Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.90
enhanced scrutiny standard normally applicable to hostile takeovers 
should be applied.91 Although the soundness of applying this en-
hanced standard has been questioned and criticized, the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.92 applied 
the Unocal standard to deal protection provisions after analogizing 
these provisions to defenses adopted by a company to ward off a hos-
tile tender offer.93 Thus, following Omnicare, dealmakers must con-
sider the application of this enhanced standard to deal protection de-
vices in negotiated non-change-of-control transactions.94 Unocal in-
volves a two-stage inquiry that first requires the board to show that 
it “had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate 
policy and effectiveness existed” and then requires a demonstration 
that the defensive response adopted by the board was “reasonable in 
relation to the threat posed.”95 This second stage of the analysis is 
further broken down into a two-step inquiry that requires the board 
first to demonstrate that “the merger deal protection devices adopted 
in response to the threat were not ‘coercive’ or ‘preclusive,’ and then 
[the board must] demonstrate that [its] response was within a ‘range 
of reasonable responses’ to the threat perceived.”96 If the deal protec-
tion devices are found to be either coercive or preclusive, then the 
court will deem them to be “draconian and impermissible.”97 Even if 
they are not found to be coercive or preclusive, they must be found to 
be reasonable to be deemed valid.98
 Thus, a target board’s decision to engage in an M&A transaction 
with an unaffiliated third party, the negotiation process, and the 
board’s actions during the preclosing period will be reviewed using 
either the deferential business judgment rule or the enhanced Revlon 
                                                                                                                    
 90. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).  
91. See, e.g., Wayne O. Hanewicz, When Silence is Golden: Why the Business Judg-
ment Rule Should Apply to No-Shops in Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements, 28 J. CORP. L. 
205, 238 (2003) (arguing for application of business judgment rule to no shops). 
 92. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).  
93. Id. at 932. With respect to the debate regarding the applicable judicial standard of 
review to deal protection devices in non-change of control transactions, see Sautter, supra 
note 9, at 538 n.63 (listing sources discussing applicable standard). 
94. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 930-31 (recognizing that deal protections in nonchange 
of control transactions are subject to Unocal enhanced scrutiny standard); Orman v. Cull-
man, No. Civ. A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004) (recognizing Om-
nicare majority’s application of Unocal to deal protection in stock-for-stock mergers); see 
also La. Muni. Police Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1182 n.10 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (stating deal protection provisions are reviewed for unreasonableness, preclusive-
ness, or coerciveness under Unocal). 
95. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
96. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935 (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 
1361, 1387-88 (Del. 1995)). 
97. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935. 
98. Id.
72 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:55 
standard depending on the transaction structure. At the same time, 
the package of deal protection provisions contained in the agreement 
is likely subject to the enhanced Unocal standard.99
III.   DELAWARE JURISPRUDENCE AND THE FIDUCIARY OUT
 As previously mentioned, the Delaware courts have yet to address 
the validity of contractual limitations on a board’s recommendation 
out. However, over the past quarter of a century, the Supreme Court 
of Delaware and the Delaware Court of Chancery have issued a 
number of decisions commenting on fiduciary outs in the context of 
no shop provisions. Although no shops and merger recommendations 
are related covenants, these covenants regulate different behavior. A 
no shop provision is a deal protection provision that helps to mini-
mize the risk of a third party “jumping” the signed transaction.100
More specifically, it is a covenant preventing a target company from 
                                                                                                                    
99. See Orman, 2004 WL 2348395, at *6 (applying Unocal standard in an all-cash 
transaction not resulting in change of control only to the issue of whether deal protection 
mechanisms were coercive); see also In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 
1016 (Del. Ch. 2005) (applying heightened Unocal standard in reviewing termination fee in 
all-cash transaction). 
100. See Kling et al., supra note 39, at 799 (stating buyers try to lessen possibility of 
third-party bidders after signing by negotiating for no shop provisions). Matching rights 
are another type of deal protection device often paired with no shop provisions and with the 
merger recommendation covenant. See In re Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1017 (stating match-
ing rights are not per se invalid and are “common contractual feature[s]”). Although these 
provisions can appear in a number of variations, generally, matching rights allow the ini-
tial buyer the opportunity to match, or exceed, the third party’s offer before the target may 
terminate the agreement in favor of the third party’s proposal. Block, supra note 33, at 99. 
These provisions typically provide that the target board give notice to the initial buyer that 
the board has received an unsolicited third-party proposal and that the board has deter-
mined that the offer is, or is reasonably likely to be, a Superior Offer. Id. Some forms of 
matching rights may prevent a board from even considering a third-party offer until the 
target has provided notice to the initial buyer. See Transmeta Corp., Current Report (Form 
8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 4.3(c)-(d) (Nov. 20, 2008) (providing after receipt of Superior Proposal 
that the target company must first give notice to the acquirer before the target may consid-
er the proposal and before the acquirer’s matching right is triggered). Once notice is pro-
vided to the initial buyer, a period must elapse before the target may terminate the agree-
ment. Block, supra note 33, at 99. This period generally ranges from three to five business 
days. See American Bar Ass’n’s Business Law Section, 2009 Strategic Buyer/Public Target 
Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study (For Transactions Announced in 2008), Slide 64, 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2009/10/Deal-Point-Study-9-10-09.pdf [hereinaf-
ter ABA 2008 Study] (indicating most deals contain three to five business day matching 
right period). During this period, the target company may be obligated to negotiate in good 
faith with the initial buyer. Block, supra note 33, at 99. When matching rights are paired 
with a merger recommendation covenant, the target board may have to inform the initial 
buyer that it intends to change its recommendation and then allow the waiting period to 
expire prior to actually changing its recommendation. See, e.g., Sun Microsystems, Inc., 
Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.03(d) (Apr. 20, 2009) (providing that target 
may, after receipt of Superior Proposal, change its recommendation to shareholders only 
after acquirer first receives notice of the Superior Proposal and has opportunity to nego-
tiate with target and match the offer). This waiting period allows the initial buyer time to 
negotiate with the target company in an attempt to cure the situation forcing the change in 
recommendation.  
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actively soliciting offers from third parties after the signing of a de-
finitive acquisition agreement.101 A pure no shop provision, or a no 
talk provision, also prevents a target company from providing infor-
mation to a third party who has made an unsolicited proposal and 
prohibits the target company from negotiating with that third par-
ty.102 These provisions are often paired with fiduciary outs that allow 
for the provision of information to a third party if the target’s board 
of directors determines that the third party’s unsolicited offer is su-
perior, or is reasonably likely to become a Superior Offer.103 In addi-
tion, the fiduciary out allows the target board to terminate the preex-
isting agreement to accept a superior, unsolicited offer if the board 
determines it is necessary to do so to avoid violating the board’s fidu-
ciary duties.104
 Despite the differences between the no shop covenant and the rec-
ommendation covenant, the Delaware jurisprudence on no shop fidu-
ciary outs provides helpful insights into when a target board may val-
                                                                                                                    
101. See Block, supra note 33, at 74 (describing no shop provisions).  
102. Id. Practitioners tend to view pure no talk provisions that are not paired with a 
fiduciary out as invalid because boards are unable to satisfy their fiduciary duties, which is 
the “legal equivalent of willful blindness.” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals 
Co., Nos. CIV. A. 17398, CIV. A. 17383, CIV. A. 17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 27, 1999) (“No-talk provisions . . . are troubling precisely because they prevent a 
board from meeting its duty to make an informed judgment with respect to even consider-
ing whether to negotiate with a third party.”).  
 103. Block, supra note 33, at 74; see also Coates, supra note 39, at 26 (presenting re-
sults of statistical study of public and private company merger agreements and stating 
85% of public company merger agreements studied contained fiduciary out allowing target 
termination right if superior offer emerged after signing); LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra 
note 63, § 1.07[3][b] (noting it is increasingly more common to include fiduciary outs allow-
ing termination of merger agreement in favor of superior offer). A study of 103 strategic 
transactions announced in 2008 revealed that in 93% of the deals surveyed the board simp-
ly had to determine that the third party proposal was “expected to result in a superior of-
fer” to satisfy the no shop fiduciary out. See ABA 2008 Study, supra note 100, at Slide 46 
(presenting pie chart with no shop fiduciary out statistics). An actual superior offer was 
required in 3% of deals and just an acquisition proposal was required in 2%. See id. It 
should be noted that when paired with a no shop provision, the fiduciary out does not allow 
the target company to actively solicit offers. See Kling et al., supra note 39, at 799 (stating 
fiduciary out does not typically apply to no-solicitation covenant). If the target would like to 
actively solicit offers after signing, the target would instead negotiate a go shop provision. 
See generally Sautter, supra note 9 (discussing go shop provisions); see also Guhan Subra-
manian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and Implications, 63
BUS. LAW. 729 (2008).
104. See Block, supra note 33, at 74-75 (describing outs in relation to window shop 
provisions). When a no shop is paired with a fiduciary out, these provisions are technically 
called window shops. See id. at 74. Practitioner, Dennis Block, has stated that in the con-
text of a Revlon transaction, the target company will opt for a window shop provision so 
that the target is able to consider third party offers after signing. Id. at 77. However, Block 
also indicates that pure no shop provisions are more likely to be upheld in the context of a 
non-Revlon transaction which is subject to a lower standard of review. Id. at 78.  
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idly agree to limit its recommendation out.105 This is the case, in part, 
because the same Superior Offer may trigger action under both the 
no shop out and the recommendation out. As a result, the Superior 
Offer out for the no shop provision is inextricably tied to the recom-
mendation out. Therefore, although the two provisions regulate dif-
ferent behavior—the no shop covenant regulates the corporation’s 
interaction with third party offerors while the recommendation cove-
nant regulates the board’s ability to withdraw its recommendation—
the two provisions are closely related. This section provides an over-
view of some of the most significant Delaware cases addressing fidu-
ciary outs, mainly in the context of no shop or no talk provisions.  
A.   Recommendation Outs and Freedom of Contract View
 A quarter of a century ago, the Supreme Court of Delaware issued 
its landmark decision, Smith v. Van Gorkom.106 In that case, Van 
Gorkom, the Chairman and CEO of the target company, stated that 
his “understanding” of corporate law was that “directors always have 
an inherent right, as well as a fiduciary duty, to accept a better offer 
notwithstanding an existing contractual commitment by the 
Board.”107 However, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected Van Gor-
kom’s “understanding” of corporate law. The court, instead, focused 
on the language of the recommendation out as well as the board’s 
perception of what the agreement provided for at the time the board 
authorized it.108 The agreement provided:  
The Board of Directors shall recommend to the stockholders of [the 
target company] that they approve and adopt the Merger Agree-
ment . . . and to use its best efforts to obtain the requisite votes 
therefor. [The acquirer] acknowledges that [the target company] di-
rectors may have a competing fiduciary obligation to the sharehold-
ers under certain circumstances.109
The court found that this italicized language did not create an effec-
tive fiduciary out allowing the board to either accept a better offer or 
to provide information to third parties.110 In addition, the court de-
                                                                                                                    
105. But see Johnston, supra note 21, at 19 (stating recommendation outs are “funda-
mentally different” from no shop outs as former involves board’s duty to communicate free-
ly with stockholders).  
 106. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
107. Id. at 879.  
108. Id. Testimony revealed the board had sought amendments to the agreement allow-
ing the provision of information to other bidders and the right to accept a better offer if one 
were to come along. Id. In fact, two outside directors “maintained that the Agreement as 
submitted was approved on the understanding that, ‘if we got a better deal, we had a right 
to take it.’ ” Id. One of the directors further testified that if the management had not put 
that into the agreement then the management did not follow the board’s instructions. Id. 
109. Id.
110. Id. 
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termined that this language did not allow the board to change its 
recommendation with respect to the transaction if circumstances 
changed.111 As a result, many commentators point to Van Gorkom as 
setting forth a contract primacy, or freedom-of-contract, view of fidu-
ciary duties.112 Under this view, the executed merger agreement 
takes precedence over the board’s fiduciary duties and the board may 
not terminate a merger agreement unless it is allowed to do so under 
the agreement.113
B.   Freedom of Contract and No Shop Fiduciary Outs
 In 1995, ten years after Van Gorkom, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery addressed a similar perception of fiduciary duties as Van 
Gorkom’s “understanding” that fiduciary duties trumped contract 
language. In that case, Renaissance Communications Corp. v. NBC, 
Inc.,114 Outlet Communications held an auction to sell itself and ulti-
mately entered into a merger agreement with Renaissance Commu-
nications pursuant to which Renaissance would pay $42.25 per share 
in an all-cash transaction.115 The Renaissance-Outlet agreement con-
tained a no shop provision with a fiduciary out allowing the Outlet 
board to terminate the agreement if it would be a breach of the 
board’s fiduciary duties not to do so.116 After the agreement was ex-
ecuted, NBC offered $47.25 per share.117 Renaissance then sought a 
temporary restraining order seeking to prevent the termination of 
the Renaissance-Outlet agreement and to prevent Outlet from enter-
ing into a new agreement with NBC.118 The then Vice Chancellor, 
Professor William Allen, denied the motion.119 In denying the motion, 
                                                                                                                    
111. Id.  
112. See, e.g., Balotti & Sparks, supra note 24, at 468-74 (describing Van Gorkom as 
adopting contract primacy approach to fiduciary duties).  
 113. Corwin v. DeTrey, CIV. A. No. 6808, 1989 WL 146231, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 
1989) (“[T]he directors of the selling corporation are not free to terminate an otherwise 
binding merger agreement just because they are fiduciaries and circumstances have 
changed The buyers, likewise, are not required to give up their rights under a binding con-
tract simply because they are fiduciaries and changed circumstances make their bargain 
more favorable.” (citations omitted) (citing Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 888)).  
 114. No. CIV.A. 14446, 1995 WL 1798510 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1995). 
115. Id. at *1. During the auction, Outlet’s investment bank, Goldman Sachs solicited 
indications of interest from potential buyers and “45 companies . . . expressed potential 
interest in purchasing Outlet.” Id. at *7. There were two rounds of bidding with the second 
round narrowing the field of bidders to seven. Id. Both Outlet and NBC submitted bids 
during the second round and Outlet won the auction. Id. at *7-8.
116. Id. at *6. 
117. Id. at *2. 
118. Id. at *3. 
119. Id. at *26. In denying the motion for a TRO, the Vice Chancellor stated,  
[T]he right is essentially a contract right. It is a right that is subject to a condi-
tion precedent and is subject to a provision regarding a fiduciary out. I certain-
ly am not in the position today to make the evaluation that there is no way that 
a responsible attorney familiar with the corporate law of this state could con-
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Allen recognized that people often think of fiduciary duties as “su-
pervening.”120 But the Vice Chancellor went on to explain that there 
must be situations, like auction sales of corporations, where the 
board can agree to remove its discretion because “[o]therwise, the 
auctions won’t work.”121
C.   The Fiduciary Limits of Freedom of Contract
1.   Ace and the Non-Delegation Principle 
 Vice Chancellor Allen’s opinion regarding auctions was echoed in 
the 1999 Delaware Chancery Court case of Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re 
Corp.122 That case involved a stock-for-stock deal pursuant to which 
Capital Re stockholders were to receive six-tenths of a share of Ace 
stock for each Capital Re share they held.123 Ace was a 12.3% stock-
holder of Capital Re stock at the time the agreement was executed 
and had entered into stockholder voting agreements with stockhold-
ers representing an additional 33.5% of Capital Re shares.124 Pur-
suant to those agreements, the stockholders agreed to vote for the 
merger “if the Capital Re board of directors did not terminate the 
Merger Agreement in accordance with its provisions.”125 The agree-
ment contained a no talk provision that prevented the board from 
soliciting offers and from negotiating with or providing information 
to a third party who made an unsolicited offer unless certain condi-
tions were satisfied.126 These conditions included a requirement that 
the Capital Re board make a good faith determination based on its 
outside legal counsel’s written advice that it would be breaching its 
fiduciary duties if it did not negotiate with or provide information to 
a third party.127 The Capital Re board could then terminate the mer-
ger agreement if the board authorized the entry into an agreement 
with a third party that had made a Superior Offer.128
                                                                                                                    
clude that the fiduciary out provision has no applicability in these circums-
tances.  
Id.
120. Id. at *15. 
121. Id. 
 122. 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999).  
123. Id. at 97.  
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 98. 
127. Id. at 98-99. The other conditions required that the board conclude that the unso-
licited offer is “reasonably likely to be or to result in a Superior Proposal”; the third party 
had to enter into a confidentiality agreement; and the Capital Re board had to provide 
“contemporaneous notice of their intent to negotiate or furnish information.” Id.
128. Id. at 99. In addition, Capital Re could not be in material breach of the merger 
agreement, a five day matching right period had to have expired without Ace making an 
offer at least as favorable as the Superior Proposal, and Capital Re was required to pay Ace 
a $25 million termination fee. Id.
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 A day prior to the stockholder vote, XL Capital entered the picture 
with an offer to purchase Capital Re for $12.50 per share which it 
later raised to $13 per share.129 The board promptly sought written 
advice from its outside counsel which stated that negotiating with XL 
Capital was “ ‘consistent with’ ” the Capital Re board’s fiduciary du-
ties.130 The Capital Re board sent notice to Ace that it considered the 
XL Capital offer a Superior Offer and a bidding war ensued between 
Ace and XL Capital, during which Ace increased its offer so that the 
stockholders would receive a mix of stock and cash with a value of at 
least $13.131 XL Capital then increased its offer to $14 in all cash, 
which prompted the Capital Re board to send another termination 
notice to Ace.132 At this point, Ace filed a motion for a temporary re-
straining order to prevent Capital Re from terminating the merger 
agreement.133
 Ace’s main contention was that the no talk out required Capital 
Re’s attorney to issue an opinion that the Capital Re board was re-
quired to negotiate with XL Capital.134 Because the attorney’s written 
advice did not say that Capital Re was legally mandated to negotiate 
with XL Capital, Ace argued that Capital Re was in breach of the 
merger agreement.135 Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, Jr. rejected this ar-
gument, stating that if that was the proper interpretation of the pro-
vision, it would likely be found invalid.136 Strine stated a board can-
not delegate its “duty to determine what its own fiduciary obligations 
require at precisely that time in the life of the company when the 
board’s own judgment is most important.”137 The Vice Chancellor 
stated that this provision was “particularly suspect” because, due to 
the stockholder voting agreements, the original transaction was 
guaranteed if Capital Re did not consider other offers.138
 Despite these findings, Strine suggested there were some “limited 
circumstances” where a board may be able to limit its ability to con-
sider superior proposals.139 According to Strine, these “limited cir-
cumstances” may include transactions “where [the] board has active-
ly canvassed the market, negotiated with various bidders in a com-
petitive environment, and believes that the necessity to close a 
                                                                                                                    
129. Id. at 99, 100. 
130. Id. at 99.  
131. Id. at 100.  
132. Id.
133. Id. at 100.  
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 100-02. 
136. Id. at 106. 
137. Id. 
138. Id.
139. Id. at 107.  
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transaction requires that the sales contest end.”140
 2.   Omnicare and the Limits of Board Discretion
 In 2003, the Delaware Supreme Court issued its controversial 
three-to-two decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.141 The 
majority assumed, arguendo, that the business judgment rule applied 
to the stock-for-stock transaction pursuant to which Genesis Health 
Ventures, Inc. would acquire NCS Healthcare, Inc.142 In this case, 
two of the directors who owned over 65% of NCS’s voting stock en-
tered into voting agreements pursuant to which they granted Genesis 
irrevocable proxies to vote their shares in favor of the Genesis mer-
ger.143 The agreements were also specifically enforceable by Genesis, 
meaning that so long as the proposed merger went to a stockholder 
vote, the shares would be voted for the Genesis merger.144 In addition, 
the merger agreement with Genesis contained a no shop provision 
with a fiduciary out allowing the board to enter into discussions with 
a third party making an unsolicited offer if the board determined 
that the offer “was or was likely to result in” a Superior Proposal.145
Furthermore, the agreement contained a force-the-vote provision.146
 After the NCS-Genesis merger agreement was executed, Omni-
care, Inc. submitted a proposal to purchase NCS.147 The NCS board 
was unable to determine whether the Omnicare offer constituted a 
Superior Proposal, as that term was defined in the agreement, and 
received a waiver from Genesis allowing it to enter into discussions 
with Omnicare regarding its offer without first determining whether 
the offer was a Superior Proposal.148 Shortly thereafter, in light of the  
                                                                                                                    
140. Id. at 107 n.36. Strine went on to state that “where a board has not explored the 
marketplace with confidence and is negotiating a deal that requires stockholder approval 
and would result in a change in stockholder ownership interests, a board’s decision to prec-
lude itself—and therefore the stockholders—from entertaining other offers is less  
justifiable.” Id.  
 141. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).  
142. Id. at 929.  
143. Id. at 919, 926.  
144. Id. at 926. 
145. Id. at 925-26. 
146. Id. at 925. 
147. Id. at 926. Omnicare had submitted a proposal to purchase NCS prior to the ex-
ecution of the NCS-Genesis merger agreement. Id. at 924. However, that proposal was 
conditioned on negotiating a merger agreement, completing due diligence, and obtaining 
third party consents. Id. By this time, NCS had already entered into an exclusivity agree-
ment with Genesis that prevented NCS from participating in discussions with a third party 
regarding a competing proposal. Id. Despite this, NCS’s independent committee met to 
consider a response to Omnicare’s proposal. Id. During that meeting the committee deter-
mined that if NCS were to enter into discussions with Omnicare, there was an “unaccepta-
ble risk that Genesis would abandon merger discussions” and the “risk of losing the Gene-
sis proposal was too substantial.” Id. 
148. Id. at 926. 
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Omnicare offer, the NCS board withdrew its recommendation and 
advised that the NCS stockholders vote against the Genesis mer-
ger.149 The board acknowledged, however, that because the board was 
subject to a force-the-vote provision and because 65% of the voting 
shares were already locked-up, NCS stockholder approval was al-
ready ensured.150 Omnicare subsequently brought suit “seeking to 
invalidate a merger agreement between NCS and Genesis on fidu-
ciary duty grounds” while NCS stockholders brought suit seeking to 
invalidate the NCS-Genesis merger on the ground that the NCS di-
rectors violated their fiduciary duty of care “in failing to establish an 
effective process designed to achieve the transaction that would pro-
duce the highest value for the NCS stockholders.”151
 The majority stated that the irrevocable voting agreements, the 
force-the-vote provision, and the lack of an effective fiduciary out 
“completely prevented the board from discharging its fiduciary re-
sponsibilities to the minority stockholders when Omnicare presented 
its superior transaction.”152 The majority declared that “the NCS 
board was required to negotiate a fiduciary out clause to protect the 
NCS stockholders if the Genesis transaction became an inferior offer” 
and by failing to do so, it had “disabled itself from exercising its own 
fiduciary obligations . . . .”153 In reaching this conclusion, the majority 
cited heavily to Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, 
Inc.154 in which the Delaware Supreme Court declared invalid certain 
defensive provisions in the Paramount-Viacom change of control 
transaction, including a stock option agreement, a no shop provision 
that was paired with a fiduciary out, and a termination fee that was 
triggered if, among other events, the Paramount board recommended 
a competing transaction.155 The QVC court found that these provi-
sions prevented the Paramount board from negotiating with third 
parties, including QVC, who had expressed an interest in Paramount 
before Paramount had executed an agreement with Viacom.156 As a 
result, the QVC court held that the Paramount board had violated its 
fiduciary duties, particularly its Revlon duties, by engaging in an un-
reasonable sale process and agreeing to these defensive provisions.157
 Chief Justice Veasey and Justice Steele authored rare dissenting 
                                                                                                                    
149. Id. at 926, 927.  
150. Id. at 927. 
151. Id. at 919. These suits were brought separately but were consolidated on appeal. Id. 
152. Id. at 936.  
153. Id. at 938.  
 154. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).  
155. Id. at 39, 49-50. 
156. Id. at 49. 
157. Id. at 36, 51.  
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opinions in Omnicare.158 Chief Justice Veasey’s opinion, which Jus-
tice Steele joined, took issue with the majority’s application of Unocal
to the facts of the case.159 They also disagreed with the majority’s 
conclusion that the board had breached its fiduciary duties by failing 
to negotiate a fiduciary out.160 Chief Justice Veasey distinguished the 
facts of Omnicare from QVC by stating that in QVC the Paramount 
board had received a Superior Offer but “turn[ed] away from it to 
lock up a less valuable deal” whereas in Omnicare the NCS board 
had locked up “the only value-enhancing transaction available” at  
the time.161
IV.   RECENT TRENDS IN RECOMMENDATION OUTS
A.   Types of Recommendation Outs 
 Recommendation outs break down into three general categories, 
with variations within each category. These outs can be thought of as 
a continuum ranging from the broadest to the narrowest form of the 
out. The broadest form is one that allows the board to withdraw or 
modify its recommendation if the board determines that its fiduciary 
duties require it to do so. The narrowest out allows a recommenda-
tion modification or withdrawal only in the case of a Superior Offer 
(or a Superior Proposal, depending on the term used in the agree-
ment). Finally, there is an intermediate form that allows a board to 
withdraw or to modify its recommendation in the case of a Superior 
Offer or an Intervening Event. This last category is the newest ver-
sion of the recommendation out and has renewed the question as to 
whether narrower recommendation outs are valid under Delaware 
law. The following section addresses each of these fiduciary outs and 
some of the variations within each category.  
 1.   Broadest Form—Fiduciary Duties 
The first and broadest form of recommendation out allows for a 
withdrawal or change in recommendation if the board finds that do- 
                                                                                                                    
158. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 939 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting); id. at 946 (Steele, J. dissent-
ing). In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Veasey acknowledged the rarity of split deci-
sions in the Delaware Supreme Court. Id. at 939 n.90 (“Split decisions by this Court, espe-
cially in the field of corporation law, are few and far between.”).  
159. Id. at 943-44. 
160. Id. at 945. 
161. Id. Others have a similar view of the QVC holding stating,  
[w]e believe the holding was premised on the failure of the target board to have 
satisfied its fiduciary duties prior to agreeing to the limitations. However, some 
have read it to impose a broader fiduciary duty “overlay,” prohibiting boards 
from approving merger agreements that preclude directors from addressing 
competing bids.  
Johnston et al., supra note 23.  
2010]  RETHINKING CONTRACTUAL LIMITS 81
ing otherwise would be a breach of the board’s fiduciary duties or if 
the board determines that continuing to recommend the transaction 
would be inconsistent with the board’s fiduciary duties. This type of 
recommendation out is the most popular form as indicated in Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) studies of strategic transactions executed 
in 2007 and 2008. The ABA study of strategic transactions executed 
in 2007 found that 45% of deals studied contained this out while 55% 
of transactions executed in 2008 included this broad out.162
 These broad outs are drafted in a variety of ways. For example, 
this out may require the board to determine that the failure to 
change its recommendation is “inconsistent with” the board’s fidu-
ciary duties while other outs require the board to make the determi-
nation that the failure to change its recommendation would be a 
“breach of” the board’s fiduciary duties.163 Thus, there appear to be 
varying standards which may be incorporated into this type of out—
the “inconsistent with” language is a lower standard to meet than the 
“breach of” fiduciary duties standard.164 Furthermore, the out may 
require that the board consult with its legal counsel and/or financial 
advisor in making the determination that the out has been trig-
gered.165 However, consistent with the Delaware Court of Chancery’s 
                                                                                                                    
 162. American Bar Association’s Section of Business Law, 2008 Strategic Buyer/Public 
Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study (For Transactions Announced in 2007), 
Slide 51, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2008/12/dealpoints-2008.pdf [hereinaf-
ter ABA 2007 Study] (setting forth statistics regarding types of merger recommendation 
fiduciary outs in public strategic deals with transaction values of $100 million or more); 
ABA 2008 Study, supra note 100, at Slide 59. 
163. Compare Am. Land Lease, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.4(c) 
(Dec. 11, 2008) (providing board may change recommendation if board “determines in good 
faith, after consultation with its outside legal counsel, that the failure to do so would be 
inconsistent with the directors’ fiduciary duties to the stockholders of the Company under 
applicable Law” (emphasis added)), with Kosan Biosciences Inc., Current Report (Form 8-
K, Exhibit 2.1) § 5.02(b) (May 29, 2008) (providing board may change recommendation if it 
“determines in good faith, after consultation with its outside legal counsel and a financial 
advisor of nationally recognized reputation, that the failure to do so would result in a 
breach of its fiduciary duties to the stockholders of the Company under applicable 
Law . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 164. Haas, supra note 3, at n.21.  
165. See Indevus Pharms., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) § 6.5 (Jan. 6, 
2009). The Indevus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. merger agreement provided as follows: 
[A]t any time prior to Offer Closing Date, the Company Board may make a 
Company Adverse Recommendation Change if a majority of the Company 
Board determines (after consultation with outside counsel) that it is necessary 
to take such actions in order to comply with its fiduciary duties to the stock-
holders of the Company under applicable Law.  
Id. § 6.5(b) (emphasis added). An example of an out requiring consultation with both legal 
counsel and financial counsel is seen in Autonomy Corporation’s acquisition of Interwoven, 
Inc. See Interwoven, Inc., (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) (Jan. 22, 2009). The merger recommen-
dation fiduciary out in that agreement provided as follows: 
[T]he Company Board may make a Company Adverse Recommendation Change 
if the Company Board determines in good faith (following consultation with its 
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decision in Ace this duty to determine what the board’s fiduciary du-
ties are cannot be delegated to either legal counsel or financial coun-
sel.166 As a result, these outs simply require consultation with legal 
counsel or financial counsel rather than a delegation of the determi-
nation to legal or financial counsel.  
 Despite the varying linguistic formulations of this out, an argu-
ment can be made that this out encompasses all events that one may 
be concerned with during the preclosing period so long as the board 
makes the determination that exercising the out is required by, or is 
consistent with, its fiduciary duties. For example, the receipt of a Su-
perior Proposal would trigger this out. Furthermore, as will be dis-
cussed in Part IV.D, a board is able to invoke this out following an 
event leading to an adverse change in stock prices.167 Finally, a posi-
tive event, like the unexpected substantial increase in value of the 
target’s stock, would also trigger this broad out.168
 In the context of the no shop fiduciary out, as well as general ter-
mination provisions, some have argued in the past that similarly 
worded vague references to fiduciary duties actually benefit the tar-
get stockholders.169 However, others have rejected this argument con-
tending that targets who insist on such broad references to fiduciary 
duties risk being perceived as “unreliable contracting partners.”170
Instead, these commentators argued that no shop provisions paired 
with the broader fiduciary out and provisions allowing termination of 
an agreement for fiduciary duty reasons “may be illusory, or just 
wishful thinking.”171 These commentators advocated language expli-
citly setting forth circumstances in which the target company would 
be able to pursue Superior Offers or terminate the agreement.172
They argued that such specifically defined language would “provide a 
level of clarity that is not supplied by references to ‘fiduciary du-
ties.’ ”173 Since these arguments were raised over ten years ago, the 
                                                                                                                    
financial advisor and its outside counsel) that failure to take such action would 
be reasonably likely to result in a breach of its fiduciary duties to the stock-
holders of the Company under applicable Law. 
Id. § 5.2(b) (emphasis added).  
166. See supra Part III.C.  
167. See infra Part IV.D; see also Balotti & Sparks, supra note 24, at 477-78 (arguing 
for broad recommendation out language and implying that broad out would be triggered by 
“changing conditions at the acquirer, or events in the industry or the economy as a whole”).  
168. See Balotti & Sparks, supra note 24, at 477-78 (arguing for broad recommendation 
out language and implying that broad out encapsulates changing conditions at target).  
169. See Johnston & Alexander, supra note 10, at 19 (stating that some may think 
broader outs benefit stockholders). 
170. Id. (arguing that broader outs may work to stockholders’ “detriment” instead 
“making such entities [that insist on broader outs] unreliable contracting parties”).  
171. Id. at 18-19.  
172. Id. at 19.  
173. Id.
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fiduciary duty termination trigger has been eschewed in favor of spe-
cific termination events.174
 2.   Narrowest Form—Only for a Superior Offer or Superior  
Proposal 
 The narrowest form of the recommendation out allows a board to 
withdraw its recommendation only if it has received a Superior Offer 
or Superior Proposal (for ease of reference, the term “Superior Offer” 
will be used throughout the remainder of this Article). The ABA 
study of strategic transactions executed in 2007 found that 48% of 
deals studied contained this out, while only 23% of transactions ex-
ecuted in 2008 included it.175 As will be discussed in the next section, 
a substantial number of deals allow a board to withdraw its recom-
mendation for either a Superior Offer or an Intervening Event. So 
while the statistics set forth above contain a wide disparity, they do 
not take into account deals containing a Superior Offer paired with 
an Intervening Event.  
 The definition of a Superior Offer varies among agreements, but 
the definitions used are generally the same as with the no shop fidu-
ciary out. As a result, as discussed in Part III, the Superior Offer out 
for the no shop provision is inextricably tied to the recommendation 
out. When the recommendation out appears in its narrowest form, or 
is limited solely to a Superior Offer, a board would be violating the 
merger recommendation covenant if it withdrew its recommendation 
for anything other than a Superior Offer. Accordingly, some have ar-
gued that the narrowest form of recommendation out is invalid as it 
prevents the board from withdrawing its recommendation even when 
changed circumstances have arisen causing the board to no longer 
believe the transaction contemplated by the merger agreement is in 
the stockholders’ best interests.176 Although some members of the De-
laware bench have made extrajudicial statements relating to these 
narrow outs, the Delaware courts have yet to formally address the 
validity of these outs in the context of a judicial opinion. Neverthe-
less, some commentators have alluded to dicta in a 2005 Delaware 
Chancery Court decision as suggesting that Superior Offer outs may 
be invalid.177 Specifically, they point to the following language from 
Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp.:178
                                                                                                                    
 174. Block, supra note 33, at 94-95 (listing common termination events).  
 175. ABA 2007 Study, supra note 162, at Slide 51 (setting forth statistics regarding 
types of merger recommendation fiduciary outs in public strategic deals); ABA 2008 Study, 
supra note 100, at Slide 59 (same).  
176. See Balotti & Sparks, supra note 24, at 477-78.  
 177. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Takeover Law and Practice 2009, 68-69 (2009)
http://financial.rrd.com/wwwFinancial/Docs/Resources/Events/2009/Panel_4_Handout_9_K
atz_TakeoverLawandPractice.pdf. 
 178. No. Civ.A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005).  
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The Merger Agreement, of course, was not an ordinary contract. 
Before the Merger could occur, the shareholders of Holly had to 
approve it. The directors of Holly were under continuing fiduciary 
duties to the shareholders to evaluate the proposed transaction. 
The Merger Agreement accommodated those duties by allowing, 
under certain circumstances, the board of directors to withdraw or 
change its recommendation to the shareholders that they vote for 
the Merger.179
One should note, however, that the merger agreement being refe-
renced in Frontier Oil contained a broad fiduciary out, not a Superior 
Offer.180 Despite this, these commentators further suggest that prac-
titioners have begun to use the intermediate form of recommendation 
out, discussed in the next section, for fear that the Superior Offer out 
may be deemed invalid on the grounds that the board’s duty of dis-
closure requires the board to be able to change its recommendation at 
anytime.181      
 3.   Intermediate Form—Superior Offer or Intervening Event  
 The third general category of recommendation outs are those outs 
that allow the board to withdraw its recommendation if there is a 
Superior Offer or an Intervening Event or, in some cases, if there is 
solely an Intervening Event. The “Intervening Event” language dates 
back to at least 2005 when it was used in Verizon Wireless’s acquisi-
tion of MCI, Inc.182 A year and a half later, in August of 2006, the “In-
tervening Event” out emerged again in two separate acquisitions by 
IBM.183 At least three more transactions in 2006 included the Inter-
vening Event out.184 The ABA study of strategic transactions ex-
                                                                                                                    
 179. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 177, at 68 n.202 (quoting Frontier Oil 
Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. Civ.A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027, at *27 (Del. Ch. April 29, 2005)). 
180. Frontier Oil Corp., No. Civ.A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027, at *27 n.178 (quoting a 
recommendation out which was not a Superior Offer out). 
 181. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 177, at 68-69. One should also note 
that there is at least one deal signed before the Frontier Oil decision that included an In-
tervening Event out. See infra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing Verizon Wire-
less-MCI Intervening Event out included in agreement executed on February 14, 2005). 
Thus, any argument that the Intervening Event out arose as a result of the Frontier Oil 
dicta is unsound. 
182. See MCI, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) § 6.5(c) (Feb. 17, 2005) (in-
cluding Intervening Event out); see also Haas, supra note 3, at 17 (acknowledging Interven-
ing Event language began being used around 2005).  
183. See FileNet Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) § 4.02(b) (Aug. 10, 
2006) (including Intervening Event out); Internet Security Sys., Inc., Current Report (Form 
8-K) § 4.02(b) (Aug. 23, 2006) (including Intervening Event language). In both transactions, 
Cravath, Swaine, & Moore LLP represented IBM. See FileNet Corp., Current Report (Form 
8-K, Exhibit 2.1) § 8.02 (Aug. 10, 2006); Internet Security Sys., Inc., Current Report (Form 
8-K, Exhibit 2.1) § 8.02 (Aug. 23, 2006).
184. See Premium Standard Farms, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), 
§4.02(b) (Sept. 20, 2006); ICOS Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), §6.3(b) (Oct. 
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ecuted in 2007 found that 6% of deals studied contained an out li-
mited to a “Superior Offer or Intervening Event,” while 1% contained 
an out limited solely to an Intervening Event.185 The out continues to 
be growing in popularity as the ABA study of 2008 transactions 
found that 13% of deals studied contained a “Superior Offer or Inter-
vening Event” out while another 1% contained a recommendation out 
limited solely to an Intervening Event.186 Finally, in the first half of 
2009, at least four transactions contained an Intervening Event out 
appearing either alone or paired with a Superior Offer out.187 Thus, 
the use of Intervening Event language is certainly gaining momen-
tum. However, as is the case with the Superior Offer out, the Dela-
ware courts have yet to either interpret these Intervening Event outs 
or speak to their validity.188
 The term Intervening Event is defined in myriad ways in merger 
agreements. Generally, an Intervening Event is some event that is 
not known or reasonably foreseeable. However, the actual triggering 
event as well as the lack of knowledge standard tends to be defined 
differently among agreements. For example, some definitions require 
actual knowledge as of the execution date of the definitive agree-
ment. For instance, in its 2008 acquisition by Vistara Corporation, 
Performance Food Group Co.’s Intervening Event out was defined as 
“a material development or change in circumstances . . . that was not 
known to [Performance Food Group] or the Company Board of Direc-
tors . . . (and not relating to any Acquisition Proposal) . . . .”189 Others 
                                                                                                                    
17, 2006); Per-Se Techs., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), §6.04(b) (Nov. 8, 
2006).
185. ABA 2007 Study, supra note 162, at Slide 51 (setting forth statistics regarding 
types of merger recommendation fiduciary outs in public strategic deals).  
 186. ABA 2008 Study, supra note 100, at Slide 59. 
187. See thinkorswim Group, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.7(b)(i) 
(Jan. 12, 2009); Merck & Co, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.4(e) (Mar. 
11, 2009); Sun Microsystems, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) (Apr. 20, 2009), 
§ 6.03(d)(ii); NATCO Group Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 5.4(e) (June 4, 
2009). 
 188. Fiduciary Outs for Intervening Events: Are They Necessary?, supra note 20 (stating 
author was not aware of cases interpreting Intervening Event language). 
 189. Performance Food Group Co., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 5.2(g)(i) 
(Jan. 18, 2008) (emphasis added). Another example of the actual knowledge standard was 
seen in United Online, Inc.’s acquisition of FTD Group, Inc. More specifically, the United 
Online-FTD Group deal defined Intervening Event as: 
a fact, event, change, development or set of circumstances with respect to or 
otherwise affecting Purchaser or any of its Subsidiaries or its or their business, 
properties, assets, liabilities, results of operation or condition (financial or oth-
erwise) occurring or arising after the date hereof that is materially adverse to 
Purchaser and its Subsidiaries taken as a whole and that was not known to the 
Board prior to the execution of this Agreement . . . . 
FTD Group, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) § 7.10(e) (May 6, 2008) (emphasis 
added); see also HireRight, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 8.1(73) (June 10, 
2008) (defining Intervening Event as “an event, unknown to the Company Board as of the 
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add a “reasonably foreseeable” standard to the definition. For exam-
ple, Oracle Corporation’s agreement to acquire Sun Microsystems, 
Inc. included an Intervening Event, defined as “a material fact, 
event, change, development or set of circumstances (other than an 
Acquisition Proposal occurring or arising after the date of this 
Agreement) that was not known to the Company Board nor reasona-
bly foreseeable by the Company Board as of or prior to the date of this 
Agreement . . . .”190 Professor Steven Davidoff has suggested that a 
similarly worded out would cover declines in the other party’s stock 
price when the consideration in a transaction was a mix of cash and 
stock.191 In particular, Professor Davidoff was referring to Interven-
ing Event language appearing in a September 2009 merger agree-
ment pursuant to which Xerox Corporation agreed to purchase Affi-
liated Computer Services, Inc.192 The Xerox-Affiliated Computer Ser-
vices Intervening Event was defined, in pertinent part, as  
a material event or circumstance that was not known to the Board 
of Directors of such party on the date of this Agreement (or if 
known, the consequences of which are not known to or reasonably 
foreseeable by such Board of Directors as of the date hereof), which 
event or circumstance, or any material consequences thereof, be-
comes known . . . .193
However, as of the date of this writing, whether Professor Davidoff’s 
interpretation of this Intervening Event definition, or a similarly 
worded definition, will hold true has yet to be tested in the courts.   
 Some Intervening Event outs specifically exclude certain events 
such as a change in financial condition of the target company, unless 
that event would rise to the level of a material adverse effect (as that 
term is defined in the agreement). For example, Merck & Co.’s 2009 
$41.1 billion cash and stock acquisition of Schering-Plough, Inc. in-
cluded an Intervening Event out with the following carve-out:  
provided, that . . . (iii) in no event shall any Event or Events that 
has or have an adverse effect on the business, financial condition, 
                                                                                                                    
date hereof, which becomes known . . . .” (emphasis added)); thinkorswim Group, Inc., Cur-
rent Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.7(b)(i) (Jan. 12, 2009) (“[A] material fact, event, 
change, development or set of circumstances (other than an Acquisition Proposal occurring 
or arising after the date of this Agreement, . . . that was not known by the Company Board 
as of or at any time prior to the date of this Agreement (and not relating in any way to any 
Acquisition Proposal) . . . .” (emphasis added)).
 190. Sun Microsystems, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.03(d)(ii) (Apr. 
20, 2009) (emphasis added).
 191. Steven M. Davidoff, Finding the Real Issues in the ACS Deal, N.Y. TIMES DEAL-
BOOK (Oct. 2, 2009, 12:28 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/finding-the-
real-issues-in-the-acs-deal/ (describing ability of company to withdraw its recommendation 
if other party’s “ ‘stock declines too much’ ”). 
192. Id.; Xerox Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), §§ 4.02(b), 4.03(b), 
8.03(f) (Sept. 28, 2009). 
 193. Xerox Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 8.03(f) (Sept. 28, 2009). 
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assets, liabilities, results of operations, or the market price of the 
securities of, a party or any of its Subsidiaries constitute an Inter-
vening Event with respect to the other party unless such Event or 
Events has had or would reasonably be expected to have a [Scher-
ing-Plough] Material Adverse Effect (if such other party is [Merck 
& Co.]) or a [Merck & Co.] Material Adverse Effect (if such other 
party is [Schering-Plough]).194
M&A practitioner, Stephen Haas, recently argued that Intervening 
Event outs, like the one above, that pose more substantive limits on 
the board’s ability to change its recommendation are more likely to be 
invalid.195 Further he contended that even the weakest forms of the 
Intervening Event definition “cannot be squared with a strict subjec-
tive analysis of the director’s belief—namely, does the director believe 
the merger is in the stockholders’ best interest?”196 However, as will be 
explained in Part V, the more precise question posed by these limited 
outs is whether the board of directors believes that the transaction as 
a whole as set forth in the merger agreement is in the stockholders’ 
best interest. This is the more appropriate question, as the board 
should have negotiated an agreement addressing many of the poten-
tial changed circumstances in other portions of the agreement, specif-
ically in the consideration section.  
B.   Disclosure and the “Back Door” Fiduciary Out
 The question as to whether the board believes the merger, as set 
forth in the merger agreement, to be in the best interests of the 
stockholders may be alleviated, in part, by another provision often 
included in merger agreements. This provision, called by some the 
“back door” fiduciary out, expressly allows the target board to dis-
close information if the board’s fiduciary duties would require it to do 
so or if required to do so under federal securities laws, including 
Rules 14e-2 and 14d-9, and Item 1012 of Regulation M-A.197 This pro-
                                                                                                                    
 194. Merck & Co., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 11, 2009) (filing Agreement 
and Plan of Merger, made as of March 8, 2009, by and among, Merck & Co., Inc., Schering-
Plough Corp., Blue, Inc., and Purple, Inc., as exhibit 2.1, with merger recommendation 
provision in art. VI, sec. 6.4(e)); Merck & Co., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 9, 
2009) (filing press release as exhibit 99.1 with estimated deal value based on March 6, 
2009 closing price of Merck stock). 
 195. Haas, supra note 3, at 19 (stating that what he refers to as “strong-form” Interven-
ing Event definitions are more likely to be found invalid). In particular, Haas argues that 
Intervening Event definitions that remove “material factors from the board’s consideration 
[are] difficult to reconcile with the board’s ongoing fiduciary duty to make a candid and 
meaningful recommendation to the company’s stockholders.” Id. 
196. Id. 
197. See ABA 2008 Study, supra note 100, at Slide 59 (describing “back door” fiduciary 
out). An example of such a provision is as follows: 
Nothing in this Section 5.4 shall prohibit the board of directors of the Company 
from taking and disclosing to the stockholders of the Company a position con-
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vision is usually paired with a recommendation out that is limited to 
a Superior Offer and/or an Intervening Event but the “back door” fi-
duciary out itself does not actually contain an out allowing the board 
to withdraw its recommendation.198 In fact, some of these clauses ex-
plicitly provide that if after making the disclosure the board fails to 
reaffirm its recommendation, the disclosure will be deemed a change 
in the board’s recommendation.199 Thus, at first glance, the “back 
door” fiduciary out appears to be a misnomer. However, upon closer 
examination, the provision may actually act as a “back door” out be-
cause it directly implicates the board’s fiduciary duty of disclosure to 
the stockholders and allows the stockholders to make their own deci-
sions with respect to the transaction. 
 This provision is meant to allow the board to comply with the 
board’s duty of disclosure while still complying with the terms of the 
negotiated contract. Presumably under this type of fiduciary out, the 
target board would be able to disclose information showing that the 
board has become aware of information that would make it unable to 
support the transaction if the transaction were subject to the broad-
est fiduciary out. However, after disclosing such information, the 
board would then continue to recommend the transaction. This would 
                                                                                                                    
templated by Rule 14e-2(a), Rule 14d-9 or Item 1012(a) of Regulation M-A 
promulgated under the Exchange Act, or other applicable Law, if the board of 
directors of the Company determines, after consultation with outside legal 
counsel, that failure to so disclose such position would constitute a violation of 
applicable Law; provided, however, that the board of directors of the Company 
shall not recommend that the stockholders of the Company tender their shares 
in connection with any tender or exchange offer (or otherwise approve or rec-
ommend any Takeover Proposal) or effect a Company Adverse Recommenda-
tion Change, unless in each case the applicable requirements of Section 5.4(e) 
and Section 5.4(f) shall have been satisfied. In addition, it is understood and 
agreed that, for purposes of this Agreement (including Article VII), a factually 
accurate public statement by the Company that describes the Company’s re-
ceipt of a Takeover Proposal and the operation of this Agreement with respect 
thereto, or any “stop, look and listen” communication by the board of directors 
of the Company pursuant to Rule 14d-9(f) of the Exchange Act or any similar 
communication to the stockholders of the Company, shall not constitute a 
Company Adverse Recommendation Change or an approval or recommendation 
with respect to any Takeover Proposal. 
Getty Images, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 5.4(g) (Feb. 26, 2008).  
198. See ABA 2008 Study, supra note 100, at Slide 59 (describing “back door”  
fiduciary out).  
 199. An example of this is seen in Project Victor Holdings, Inc.’s acquisition of SM&A, 
which provided, in pertinent part, as follows:  
provided, however, that any such disclosure . . . shall be deemed to be a Change 
of Company Recommendation . . . unless the board of directors of the Company 
expressly reaffirms its recommendation to its stockholders in favor of the adop-
tion of this Agreement and the Merger at least two (2) Business Days prior to 
the Stockholders Meeting. 
SM&A, Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.2(f) (Oct. 31, 2008). 
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likely achieve a similar result as occurred following a comparable 
disclosure made in 2000 by Zions Bancorporation to its stockholders 
relating to its acquisition of First Security Corp. On June 6, 1999, 
Zions entered into a merger agreement pursuant to which it would 
acquire First Security in a stock-for-stock transaction valued at ap-
proximately $5.9 billion.200 The merger agreement contained a mer-
ger recommendation covenant but did not contain a recommendation 
out for either company’s board.201 After First Security issued a press 
release revealing that its earnings had declined, Zions issued a sup-
plemental proxy statement that stated in pertinent part: 
A proxy statement/prospectus dated February 17, 2000 was mailed 
to you on or about that date. Subsequent to such mailing, First Se-
curity has publicly announced information relating to its earnings 
and revenues for the first quarter of 2000 and our financial advisor 
has withdrawn its fairness opinion and advised Zions that it was 
no longer able to conclude that the exchange ratio was fair, from a 
financial point of view, to Zions shareholders. The purpose of this 
proxy statement supplement is to inform you of that information 
and to update other disclosures in the proxy statement/prospectus. 
In order to permit you to consider the information in this supple-
ment, our special shareholders meeting has been postponed to 
March 31, 2000.
 Your vote is very important. We cannot complete the merger un-
less our shareholders adopt the merger agreement at the sharehold-
er meeting.202
Despite the board’s emphasis in the supplemental proxy statement 
that the merger could not be completed without the stockholders’ af-
firmative vote, the Zions Bancorporation’s stockholders voted down 
the agreement at the special meeting held on March 31, 2000.203 The 
following day, First Security terminated the merger agreement.204
Notwithstanding the outcome of this transaction, some have criti-
cized the supplemental proxy statement because “on its face [it] 
didn’t do anything to undercut its recommendation of the deal, but 
                                                                                                                    
 200. Zions Bancorporation, Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1) (June 7, 1999).  
 201. Zions Bancorporation, (Schedule 13D, Exhibit 99.1) § 6.02(b) (June 16, 1999). Spe-
cifically, the recommendation provision provided, in pertinent part:  
Such boards of directors shall at all times continue such recommendations in 
effect without qualification and shall use, and cause Zions and First Security, 
respectively, to use reasonable best efforts to obtain such adoption (it being un-
derstood and agreed that the obligations under this sentence shall not be al-
tered by the commencement, proposal, disclosure or communication of any Ac-
quisition Proposal). 
Id.  
 202. Zions Bancorporation, Supplemental Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A Informa-
tion), at 1 (Mar. 15, 2000) (emphasis added).  
203. See Zions Bancorporation, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 8 (May 11, 2000).  
204. Id. 
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basically said our financial advisor has now concluded that this is a 
terrible deal for stockholders.”205
 Vice Chancellor Strine raised similar criticisms in remarks made 
in 2006 at the 33rd Annual Securities Regulation Institute. Specifi-
cally, he stated, “for those of you who say that you can disclose all the 
other material facts that suggest why your recommendation is false 
and then supposedly recommend in favor of the deal, you might re-
member that a lot of stockholders actually trust you . . . .”206 Other 
than in extrajudicial statements like this one, Delaware courts have 
not yet addressed the validity of this type of provision.  
C.   Termination Fees and the Recommendation Out
 Another significant consideration with respect to recommendation 
outs is the termination, or break-up, fees that are, or sometimes more 
importantly are not, triggered when a board withdraws its recom-
mendation. Although termination fees are a common deal protection 
device, a variety of termination events may trigger these fees.207 For 
purposes of this Article the most common and important termination 
fee triggers are: (1) a change or withdrawal in the board’s recommen-
dation of the existing merger agreement, (2) a failure to reaffirm the 
board’s recommendation or a failure to include the recommendation 
in the proxy statement, (3) a stockholder “no” vote on the proposed 
deal, and (4) termination of a merger agreement in favor of a third 
party’s Superior Offer.208 With respect to each of these events, the 
exact triggering language as well as the conditions that must be sa-
tisfied prior to the payment of the termination fee varies from deal to 
deal. As a general matter, however, once a board changes or with-
draws its recommendation, the other party may terminate the mer-
ger agreement, and upon that termination, the termination fee be-
comes payable. 
 Another consideration with respect to termination fees is when 
the fee becomes payable in the event that the agreement contains a 
force-the-vote provision. If the agreement allows the buyer to termi-
                                                                                                                    
 205. Negotiating Acquisitions, supra note 76, at 260 (2002) (remarks made by  
Joel Greenberg). 
 206. Keith A. Flaum, 2007 M&A Deal Points Studies—Public Targets, 12 No. 2 THE 
M&A LAW. 1 (Feb. 2008). 
207. See In re Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d 975, 1017 (Del. Ch. 2005) (stating termination fees 
are not per se invalid and they are “common contractual feature[s]”). Termination fees are 
considered deal protection provisions because they make third-party topping bids more 
expensive as well as compensate the acquirer for expenses incurred in negotiating the 
agreement. Sautter, supra note 9, at 536-37.  
208. See Block, supra note 33, at 94 (setting forth typical events triggering termination 
fees); see also ABA 2007 Study, supra note 162, at Slides 56-61 (describing termination fee 
triggers appearing in strategic deals executed in 2007); ABA 2008 Study, supra note 100, 
at Slides 65-70 (describing termination fee triggers in strategic deals executed in 2008). 
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nate the agreement upon the change in board recommendation, a 
force-the-vote provision does not prevent the buyer from exercising 
this termination right. Thus, once the target board changes its rec-
ommendation, the buyer is allowed to call the shots with respect to 
whether it would like to immediately terminate the agreement and 
likely obtain the termination fee or force the target stockholders to 
vote on the transaction.209 In the event that the buyer forces the vote, 
the target board would disclose the reasons for withdrawing its rec-
ommendation prior to the stockholders’ meeting.210 If the stockhold-
ers subsequently vote down the transaction, the buyer would then 
obtain the termination fee if the agreement provides a termination 
fee trigger for stockholder “no” votes.211 Thus, a force-the-vote provi-
sion acts as a deal protection device because it allows the buyer to 
determine whether the transaction should be submitted to the stock-
holders for a vote and provides the buyer with a greater assurance 
that the agreement is binding with the exception of the stockholder 
vote.212
 The deal certainty sought by the inclusion of termination fees, and 
sometimes force-the-vote provisions, may be threatened when the 
contract language varies from this typical procedure. For example, 
some recent deals have included a broad fiduciary out yet provided 
that the termination fee would only become payable if the board 
withdrew its recommendation and the company subsequently entered 
into a transaction with a third party who had made an acquisition 
proposal.213 Thus, if the board withdraws its recommendation due to 
an event outside of the receipt of a Superior Offer, the company may 
not end up paying a termination fee at all.214 Instead, the company 
                                                                                                                    
 209. Negotiating Acquisitions, supra note 76, at 264-65 (2002) (remarks made by Rick 
Climan describing buyer’s choices following target’s change of recommendation in deal 
including force-the-vote provision). 
210. See Block, supra note 33, at 87 (noting that if the target board withdraws its rec-
ommendation and the buyer forces a vote, the target board must still disclose the informa-
tion required for the shareholders to vote on merger).  
 211. Negotiating Acquisitions, supra note 76, at 264-65 (2002) (remarks made by Rick 
Climan describing the buyer’s choices following the target’s change of recommendation in a 
deal including a force-the-vote provision); see also Steven M. Davidoff, Disney’s Firm Grip 
on the Hulk, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 2, 2009, 3:45 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.
com/2009/09/02/disneys-firm-grip-on-the-hulk/ (describing the possible outcomes of a Dis-
ney-Marvel deal that included force-the-vote if the Marvel board were to change its rec-
ommendation); Stephen I. Glover, Designing Termination Fee Payment Triggers, 6 NO. 1 
THE M&A LAW. 14 (2002) (describing results of survey of ten transactions and stating that 
in five of the ten transactions surveyed termination fees were payable so long as board 
withdrew its recommendation, even if stockholders voted for agreement). 
212. See Balotti & Sparks, supra note 24, at 473 (explaining force-the-vote provisions 
that arose in part due to the buyer’s desire to have a binding agreement). 
213. See, e.g., Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) § 9.03(b)(i) 
(June 23, 2008); see also Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 13, 2008) 
(describing termination fee provision).
214. See infra text accompanying note 238.  
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may be simply required to reimburse the other party up to a prede-
termined amount for fees and expenses.215 The use of this termina-
tion fee trigger reduces deal certainty. If a board of directors may 
withdraw its recommendation for something other than a Superior 
Offer and a termination fee is not triggered, how does the other party 
ensure that the board is acting because of its fiduciary duties and not 
for some other reason?
 On the other end of the spectrum are termination fees that are 
triggered no matter whether the board has withdrawn its recommen-
dation consistent with the relevant recommendation out or not. For 
example, some agreements provide that the other party may termi-
nate the agreement upon a change in recommendation whether or not
the change in recommendation was actually permitted under the 
agreement.216 In such a case, the termination fee will become paya-
ble.217 Thus, the possibility exists that a board may withdraw its rec-
ommendation for a reason not permitted by the recommendation out 
but will pay the same termination fee as the termination fee payable 
if it were to withdraw its recommendation consistent with the rec-
ommendation out.218
 Yet another issue that should be considered with respect to rec-
ommendation outs is the fee size. In the past several years, the De-
laware courts have upheld as reasonable termination fees ranging 
from 1% to 6% of a deal’s transaction value.219 At the same time, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery has indicted, in dicta, that a 6.3% ter-
mination fee “seems to stretch the definition of range of reasonable-
ness and probably stretches the definition beyond its breaking 
point.”220 Recently, commentators have noted a gradual shift upwards 
of termination fees.221 When in the not too distant past, termination 
fees of 3% were common place, in recent years, termination fees have 
hovered increasingly closer to 4%.222 No matter if the termination fee 
                                                                                                                    
215. Id.
216. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) Art. VIII (Mar. 
11, 2009) (including termination fee triggered on change of recommendation whether or not 
permitted under agreement). 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
 219. Block, supra note 33, at 90; see also Sautter, supra note 9, at 536 n.54, 547-48, 548 
n.112 (describing termination fees Delaware courts have upheld).
 220. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Nos. CIV. A. 17398, CIV. A. 
17383, CIV. A. 17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999). 
221. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Examining the Terms of the Sun-Oracle Deal, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 23, 2009, 3:03 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/ 
examining-the-terms-of-the-sun-oracle-deal/ [hereinafter Davidoff, Sun-Oracle] (stating 
termination fees have been creeping upward in Delaware).  
 222. Davidoff, Sun-Oracle, supra note 221 (“According to Factset MergerMetrics, for 
transactions with a value greater than $100 million the average termination fee was 3.5% 
and 3.53% in 2008 and 2007, respectively. But 22% and 23.2% of deals in 2008 and 2007, 
respectively, had a greater than a 4% termination fee.”); Fox & Wolf, Deal Protection, supra 
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is 3% or 4%, the same termination fee tends to apply regardless of 
the event triggering the fee. Stephen Haas has argued that this for-
mulation of one standard termination fee should be reconsidered and 
that dealmakers should adopt a staggered fee structure as an alter-
native to narrower recommendation outs.223 More specifically, he ar-
gues that a “sizeable” termination fee should be triggered if a board 
changes its recommendation for something other than a Superior Of-
fer.224 Haas contends that such a significant termination fee acts as a 
check on the board’s determination of whether it should withdraw its 
recommendation.225 Furthermore, he raises a compelling argument 
that a larger fee which becomes payable only if the board withdraws 
its recommendation for something other than a Superior Offer would 
withstand the Unocal enhanced scrutiny test because it is neither 
coercive nor preclusive as it is would not be triggered by a stockhold-
er “no vote” or Superior Offer.226 In Part V of this Article, I argue that 
dealmakers should adopt a staggered termination fee framework as 
proposed by Haas. However, I contend that such a staggered termi-
nation fee should not be an alternative to narrower recommendation 
outs as Haas appears to propose but rather should be paired with 
intermediate recommendation outs. This type of formulation avoids 
the outcome described earlier in this section where the board with-
draws its recommendation for something other than a Superior Offer 
and ends up only having to reimburse the buyer for its expenses. 
D.   Recent Examples of Target Boards Exercising Their  
Recommendation Withdrawal Rights
 The current recommendation out drafting trends and related ter-
mination fees take on an even greater significance when one consid-
ers recent, unprecedented actions that two different boards of direc-
tors took in withdrawing their recommendations in favor of signed  
                                                                                                                    
note 5, at 1 (noting shift over past twenty-four months of termination fees closer to 4% as 
compared to 3% in past). In November 2009, the investment bank, Houlihan Lokey, pub-
lished its annual study of termination fees. See Houlihan Lokey 2008 Transaction Termi-
nation Fee Study (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.hl.com/email/pdf/fas_transaction_ 
terminal_study_2008.pdf (summarizing results of 2008 termination fee study and compar-
ing results to 2006 and 2007). In that study of 145 transactions, Houlihan Lokey found that 
the mean termination fee as a percentage of transaction value for 2008 was 3.4% while the 
mean termination fees as a percentage of transaction value for 2007 and 2006 were 3.1% 
and 3.2%, respectively. Id. at 6. The mean termination fees as a percentage of enterprise 
value for 2008, 2007, and 2006 were as follows: 3.8%, 3.0%, and 2.6%, respectively. Id. at 8. 
 223. Haas, supra note 3, at 20. 
224. Id.
225. See id. (stating that more significant termination fees limit “circumstances that 
can influence the board’s view of the merger”). 
226. Id.
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merger agreements.227 Both boards withdrew their recommendations 
not because a third party came forward with a Superior Offer; rather, 
they attributed their changes of recommendation to “changed cir-
cumstances.” Both transactions involved the broadest recommenda-
tion out—an out based on a breach of fiduciary duties—and both 
deals were stock-for-stock transactions.228 Moreover, in both cases, 
the boards withdrew their recommendations during the midst of the 
financial crisis, and in neither case were the recommendation with-
drawals followed by a law suit.  
 On November 10, 2008, Corn Products International’s board of 
directors withdrew its recommendation of a merger agreement that it 
had entered into approximately four months earlier with Bunge 
Ltd.229 Pursuant to that June 21, 2008 merger agreement, Corn 
Products stockholders were to receive Bunge shares with a market 
value of $56 for each share of Corn Products stock.230 The agreement 
included a price collar but the collar was not paired with walk-away 
rights.231 This figure represented “a 31 percent premium to [Corn 
Products’] closing price” on the previous trading day.232 On the day 
the deal was announced a Citibank analyst was quoted as saying, 
“ ‘[T]his is a good deal for both companies . . . Corn Products gets a 
substantial premium to its prior closing price . . . and Bunge uses its 
very strong stock as its currency to do the deal.’ ”233
 The Corn Products-Bunge merger agreement provided that the 
Corn Products board could change its recommendation if it deter-
mined that the “failure to make a Change in Company Recommenda-
tion would be inconsistent with the directors’ exercise of their fidu-
ciary obligations to [Corn Products] and its stockholders under appli-
cable Law . . . .”234 On November 4, 2008, the Corn Products board 
sent notice to Bunge that it intended to withdraw its recommenda-
tion of the agreement and six days later the board announced it had 
withdrawn its recommendation.235 While the press releases never 
                                                                                                                    
 227. Professor Steven Davidoff summed up the unprecedented nature of these actions 
best by writing “Corn Products’ board did something Wednesday that M&A attorneys often 
talk about, but I can’t remember when it last happened.” Davidoff, Deal Failures, supra 
note 21.  
 228. As of the date of this writing, it does not appear that a board of directors has 
withdrawn its recommendation of a transaction pursuant to an Intervening Event out.  
229. See Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1) (Nov. 10, 2008).  
230. See Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1) (June 23, 2008). 
231. See Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) (June 23, 2008) 
(including exchange ratio but no walk-away rights). 
 232. Update 6—Bunge to Buy Corn Products, for $4.4 billion, REUTERS, June 23, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2345070820080623. 
233. Id.  
234. See Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) §7.05(e) (June 
23, 2008) (including merger recommendation covenant).  
235. See Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1) (Nov. 5, 2008) 
(announcing Corn Products board notice to Bunge regarding intent to withdraw recom-
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formally stated the reason why the Corn Products board decided to 
withdraw its recommendation, they mentioned the decline in value of 
both companies’ stock thus alluding that the recommendation with-
drawal was for financial reasons.236 Although the agreement con-
tained a force-the-vote provision permitting Bunge to require Corn 
Products to hold a stockholders meeting to vote on the existing 
agreement, Bunge chose to terminate the merger agreement in ac-
cordance with its terms.237 The termination fee provision in that deal 
was drafted so that if the Corn Products board withdrew its recom-
mendation, the termination fee of $110 million only became payable 
if the company entered into a definitive agreement with a third party 
who had submitted an acquisition proposal within twelve months of 
the withdrawal.238 However, under the agreement Bunge could seek 
reimbursement for its fees and expenses associated with the transac-
tion for up to $10 million.239
The Corn Products board was not the only target company board 
to change its recommendation without having received a Superior 
Offer. On January 20, 2009, the Zygo Corporation board of directors 
withdrew its recommendation in favor of the agreement it had pre-
viously executed with Electro Scientific Industries, Inc., or ESI.240
The October 15, 2008 merger agreement provided that the Zygo 
board could withdraw or modify its recommendation if the board “de-
termined in good faith, after consultation with outside counsel, that 
failure to take such action would be inconsistent with [Zygo’s] direc-
tors’ fiduciary duties to the [Zygo] stockholders.”241 The agreement 
did not contain a price collar and instead contained a basic fixed ex-
change ratio of 1.0233 shares of ESI common stock for each share of 
Zygo common stock held.242 Unlike Corn Products, Zygo directly cited 
economic reasons for its change of heart. In particular, a Zygo press 
                                                                                                                    
mendation of merger agreement); Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhi-
bit 99.1) (Nov. 10, 2008) (announcing Corn Products board withdrew its recommendation of 
Corn Products-Bunge merger agreement and recommended against adoption of agreement).  
 236. In a press release issued by the Bunge board after receipt of Corn Products’ 
change of recommendation notice, the Bunge board refers to the “effect[s] of unprecedented 
turmoil in the equity markets on our companies’ stocks . . . .” Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc., Cur-
rent Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1) (Nov. 5, 2008).  
237. See Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 13, 2008) (announcing 
Bunge’s termination of merger agreement); see also Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc., Current Report 
(Form 8-K) § 7.01(b) (June 23, 2008) (including force-the-vote provision).  
238. See Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) § 9.03(b)(i) 
(June 23, 2008) (including termination fee trigger); see also Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc., Current 
Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 13, 2008) (describing termination fee provision). 
239. See Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Exhibit 2.1) § 9.03(c) (June 
23, 2008); see also Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 13, 2008) (de-
scribing reimbursement of fees and expenses). 
240. See Zygo Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1) (Jan. 21, 2009) (filing 
notice of withdrawal letter). 
 241. Zygo Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) §5.4(e) (Oct. 21, 2008).
242. Id. § 2.1(a) (containing exchange ratio).  
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release stated that the Zygo board reevaluated the merger because of 
“changes in conditions since the merger agreement was executed on 
October 15, 2008, and the ZYGO Board’s view of the impact of these 
changes on the current and expected performance and operations of 
ZYGO and ESI.”243 This deal did not include a force-the-vote provi-
sion and the parties agreed to terminate the merger agreement.244
Although a $6.6 million termination fee was triggered under the 
agreement, Zygo paid ESI $5.4 million pursuant to a settlement 
agreement.245
 Because the Corn Products-Bunge and Zygo-ESI deals involved 
the triggering of the broadest fiduciary outs, we can only speculate as 
to how these transactions would have played out had these deals in-
volved a more narrowly worded out. It is with this backdrop that we 
arrive at the unanswered question as to whether a narrower recom-
mendation out, such an out simply for a Superior Offer or an out for a 
Superior Offer or Intervening Event, would be upheld under Dela-
ware law.    
V.   RETHINKING THE RECOMMENDATION OUT
A.   The Validity of Narrower Recommendation Outs 
 Delaware courts have never addressed the validity of the interme-
diate or narrower forms of the recommendation out. In fact, outside 
of Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware courts have not directly 
tackled recommendation outs and what types of recommendation 
outs are permissible under Delaware law. As a result of Van Gorkom
and Delaware and federal statutory provisions, practitioners are well 
aware that recommendation covenants must be accompanied by a 
fiduciary out. But how narrow that out may be drafted is an open 
question. In addressing whether boards may contractually limit their 
fiduciary duties in the context of a recommendation out, one would be 
remiss in failing to address a well respected Delaware Court of Chan-
cery judge’s repeated statements that limitations on a board’s rec-
ommendation out are, in his opinion, invalid.246 Specifically, with re-
spect to the Superior Offer out, Vice Chancellor Strine has stated: 
                                                                                                                    
 243. Zygo Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.2) (Jan. 21, 2009). 
244. See Zygo Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) §1 (April 3, 2009).  
245. See Zygo Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) §§ 8.3(c), 8.1(b)(ii) (Oct. 21, 
2008) (providing for $6.6 million termination fee payable by Zygo upon withdrawal of rec-
ommendation); Zygo Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) § 3 (Apr. 3, 2009). The 
Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release provided for Zygo to pay an additional $1.2 
million to be paid if Zygo were to approve another proposal within six months. See id. § 4.  
246. See Davidoff, Getting Creative, supra note 20 (describing Vice Chancellor’s Strine’s 
comments at the 2009 Tulane Corporate Law Institute regarding his doubt of validity of 
contractual limitations on recommendation out); Flaum, supra note 206 (describing Vice 
Chancellor Strine’s remarks on January 18, 2006 at the 33rd Annual Securities Regulation 
Institute regarding skepticism of merger recommendation fiduciary out limitations).  
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If you’re going to put out a proxy statement containing a board 
recommendation 45 days before the vote, and there’s a contract 
that says the board must recommend the deal unless there’s a 
higher bid, and the board really doesn’t like the deal and the rea-
son it doesn’t like the deal is because something positive happened 
to the target’s business or “you’ve been . . . looking for some food 
and up from the ground came bubblin’ crude” . . . if the board none-
theless recommends the deal, I think it’s violated its fiduciary du-
ties . . . I’d also say that if you are giving advice that puts the 
board in that predicament, I think that it’s kind of dumb ad-
vice . . . . This whole thing is better dealt with in the termination 
fee context, rather than in promising to tell a lie.247
Vice Chancellor Strine’s statements, and similar statements made by 
practitioners over the years, raise the issue of whether these state-
ments are any indication of future decisions or practice. It is worth 
noting that Vice Chancellor Strine made similar comments at confe-
rences questioning the validity of go shops, or provisions allowing the 
target company to actively solicit third party offers after signing.248
But within a few months of making those comments, he issued two 
back-to-back opinions validating the use of go shops.249 Thus, Strine’s 
extrajudicial statements must be taken with a grain of salt and one 
cannot expect him, when he is finally confronted with the same issue 
in the context of a comprehensive fact pattern, to rule the same way 
as his extrajudicial statements may suggest. Rather a judge’s (or a 
practitioner’s) statements criticizing narrower recommendation outs 
should be viewed as that person’s ideal outcome—not necessarily an 
indication of their future action.250 These articulations of an ideal 
outcome should not necessarily result in a rule that a narrower rec-
ommendation out is a per se violation of Delaware law. 
 Instead of concluding that narrower recommendation outs are per 
se violations of Delaware law, Delaware courts should address these 
cases on a case-by-case basis. As is required under Van Gorkom,
courts must consider the process by which the board agreed to the 
narrower recommendation out and consider the information the 
board had at its disposal at that time. The courts should evaluate the 
possibility that entering into a narrower recommendation out pro-
                                                                                                                    
 247. Flaum, supra note 206. Professor Edward Rock has stated that such “extrajudicial 
utterances can . . . be read as attempts to be heard on a critical matter in the absence of a 
case raising just the right issue and in the absence of the articulation (or articulability) of a 
governing rule” and that such statements are “advisory opinions.” Edward B. Rock, Saints 
and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1095 
(1997).  
248. See Sautter, supra note 9, at 564 & n.205 (describing Strine’s statements of skep-
ticism regarding go shop provisions and noting his later blessing of the provisions).
249. See id.
250. For an example of a practitioner’s skepticism of narrower recommendation outs, 
see supra note 76. 
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vides a corporation with more options to structure a transaction in a 
manner that maximizes deal certainty. Such deal certainty should 
result in a better deal for stockholders—buyers should be willing to 
pay more for a more certain deal. If, instead, a buyer is faced with 
uncertainty, it may be inclined to discount the price it is willing to 
pay?an outcome that comprises stockholder value and is thus con-
trary to the target company’s fiduciary duties.251 The presence of a 
narrower recommendation out provides the buyer with an increased 
certainty that the deal will be finalized, which in turn provides both 
peace of mind and the incentive to pay a higher price for the target 
company.252 In his dissent in Omnicare, Chief Justice Veasey, alluded 
to this very situation by stating: 
Certainty itself has value. The acquirer may pay a higher price for 
the target if the acquirer is assured consummation of the transac-
tion. The target company also benefits from the certainty of com-
pleting a transaction with a bidder because losing an acquirer 
creates the perception that a target company is damaged goods, 
thus reducing its value.253
 Moreover, as then Vice Chancellor, Professor William Allen, arti-
culated in Renaissance Communications, and Vice Chancellor Strine 
postulated in Ace, a board of director must be able to agree to remove 
its discretion in order for the auction sale of a company to work. In 
such a situation, if the board has fully shopped the target company, 
the board should have the right to limit its change of recommenda-
tion to certain defined circumstances. Allowing the board to do so 
furthers the policies set forth by both Allen and Strine in the context 
of no shop outs.
B.   Narrower Recommendation Outs are Preferable 
 As discussed in Part IV.A, despite Strine’s extrajudicial state-
ments and other commentary arguing against narrow recommenda-
                                                                                                                    
 251. I should note, however, that although I am advocating for the use of a narrower 
recommendation out, I am not advocating for anything less than a Superior Offer out. In 
other words, in all deals, the target’s board of directors should be able to withdraw its rec-
ommendation if it has received a Superior Offer.  
 252. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 943 (Del. 2003) (Veasey, 
C.J., dissenting). Numerous scholars have also debated whether the deal certainty created 
by deal protection devices leads to higher prices. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 75 (arguing 
that “transactional certainty is an item of value that targets may offer acquirers in ex-
change for an increase in price or other concessions in the merger agreement.”); Thanos 
Panagopoulos, Thinking Inside the Box: Analyzing Judicial Scrutiny of Deal Protection 
Devices in Delaware, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 437, 444 (2006) (arguing that a buyer will pay 
a premium for increased transaction certainty); Brian J.M. Quinn, Bulletproof: Mandatory 
Rules for Deal Protection, 32 IOWA J. CORP. L. 865, 877-80 (2007) (arguing that “bullet-
proof” transactions do not result in higher prices because “bulletproof” transactions limit 
competition).  
 253. Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 942 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting). 
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tion outs, practitioners have continued to include solely Superior Of-
fer outs, and now more recently, Intervening Outs, in their merger 
agreements.254 In these deals, boards and their advisors are making a 
strategic negotiating decision that the narrower fiduciary out will 
allow the board to change its recommendation for the unforeseen 
events it deems most likely to occur during the preclosing period. 
More specifically, these dealmakers are negotiating provisions that 
“reflect a reasonable balance of the competing interests of the two 
parties to a transaction within the framework of the relevant market 
and deal-specific framework.”255 In a quest for deal certainty, particu-
larly in uncertain economic times, the narrowing of the fiduciary out 
provides parties with greater certainty as to when a board may be 
able to withdraw its recommendation of a transaction. However, par-
ties are accepting the risk that courts may deem these narrower fidu-
ciary outs invalid if challenged. But, if the almost complete lack of 
case law on recommendation outs is any evidence of the lack of litiga-
tion in this area, the risk of these narrower outs being litigated and 
deemed invalid is far outweighed by the deal certainty created by the 
narrower outs.  
 Dealmakers sought a similar certainty several years ago when 
they debated whether fiduciary duties alone should provide a basis 
for terminating a merger agreement.256 Nowadays, the general fidu-
ciary duties trigger has been rejected as a basis for terminating a 
merger agreement in favor of certain defined events.257 Dealmakers 
who continue to use narrower recommendation outs, and specifically 
Superior Offer outs, are trying to achieve that same level of certainty 
that is achieved by eschewing general fiduciary duties as a trigger for 
terminating a merger agreement.  
 Articulating the events upon which the board may withdraw its 
recommendation provides a level of certainty for dealmakers. After 
many years of case law and commentary interpreting and applying 
the Superior Offer out in the context of the no shop provision and 
many examples of this out being triggered, dealmakers are better 
                                                                                                                    
254. See Flaum, supra note 206 (noting that despite Strine’s comments narrower rec-
ommendation outs continue to be used, and actually increased in usage). For an example of 
practitioners’ comments regarding fiduciary outs, see supra note 76. 
 255. Fox & Wolf, Deal Protection, supra note 5, at 2. These commentators have 
summed up the objectives of parties in the negotiating process as follows:  
The twin goals should be to achieve a reasonable outcome that weighs the eco-
nomic interests of both parties, while at the same time avoiding the risk that a 
court will find that a seller’s board breached its fiduciary duties by agreeing to 
overly burdensome protections (and thereby also exposing the buyer to the risk 
that some or all of the protections will be voided by the court). 
Id. 
256. Supra text accompanying notes 169-74.  
257. See Block, supra note 33, at 94-95 (listing common termination events).  
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able to draft provisions relating to the Superior Offer. Accordingly, 
they understand how to react when a Superior Offer arises and 
boards understand that the receipt of a Superior Offer should trigger 
its fiduciary duty to withdraw its recommendation of a transaction. 
As previously discussed, all formulations of the recommendation out 
encompass Superior Offers and thus allow a target board to with-
draw its recommendation if it were to determine that a Superior Of-
fer has been received. Therefore, the ambiguity centers on the more 
obscure events that may or may not occur during the preclosing pe-
riod. Specifically, the issue is whether, upon the occurrence of one of 
these events, the board can withdraw its recommendation pursuant 
to the recommendation out contained in the merger agreement or 
whether by withdrawing its recommendation, the board would be 
breaching the merger recommendation covenant. Because these 
events are rare and there is limited to no case law in this area, 
boards have minimal guidance in how to react to such events. 
C.   Does the Satisfaction of a Board’s Fiduciary Duties Presigning 
Permit the Use of a Narrower Recommendation Out? 
 While referring to Vice Chancellor Strine’s comments regarding 
narrower recommendation outs, Professor Davidoff inquired, 
[I]s the question being asked wrong? Should it not be whether a 
board can limit its fiduciary duties, but rather phrased as, “Can a 
target board having shopped the company and being fully informed 
pre-agree to limit its recommendation to only new items?” I sus-
pect that this question might be answered differently.258
Professor Davidoff’s rephrasing of the question to be asked, as well as 
his suspicion that this question would be answered in a different 
manner merits further exploration. This rephrasing brings to the fo-
refront the board’s fiduciary duties during the acquisition process. In 
determining to enter into the merger itself, the board should have 
become informed as to the value of the business that it is selling (or 
acquiring) as well as to any claims that may increase or decrease the 
firm’s value. Moreover, if a transaction has triggered a board’s Revlon
duties, the board should have “shopped” the company to some degree 
to determine whether the offer it is accepting maximizes stockholder 
value.259 In deciding to enter into a particular transaction, the board 
                                                                                                                    
 258. Davidoff, Sun-Oracle, supra note 221.  
259. See Sautter, supra note 9, at 538-42 (describing “shopping” process of company 
that satisfies board’s Revlon duties). Moreover, in Ace, Vice Chancellor Strine alluded to 
this very notion when he stated that when the board has “actively canvassed the market, 
negotiated with various bidders in a competitive environment, and believes that the neces-
sity to close a transaction requires that the sales contest end” the board may be able to 
limit its ability to consider Superior Proposals. Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 
107 n.36 (Del. Ch. 1999). In such a case, if the board is able to limit its ability to consider 
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must have determined, consistent with its applicable fiduciary du-
ties, that the transaction is in the best interests of the corporation 
and its stockholders. Thus, an informed board that has acted consis-
tently with its fiduciary duties as of signing will only be presented 
with a limited number of events during the preclosing period which 
may require it to withdraw its recommendation so as not to violate 
its fiduciary duties.  
 In a Revlon transaction, there are two circumstances that may 
occur during the preclosing period which may trigger the board’s con-
tinuing duty to maximize stockholder value. First and foremost, is 
the receipt of a Superior Offer. As previously discussed, the receipt of 
a Superior Offer would, in most cases, trigger a board’s no shop out 
and should trigger the board’s recommendation out, no matter how 
that out is drafted. The less likely change of circumstances is that of 
an unexpected and unforeseen positive event causing the company’s 
value to increase such that the value to be received in the proposed 
transaction no longer maximizes stockholder value. If such an event 
occurs, the board would be able to change its recommendation under 
the broadest recommendation out and under most forms of the in-
termediate out. The only out that would not be triggered is the nar-
rowest out—the out that is limited solely to a Superior Offer. Thus, 
limiting a board’s recommendation to the intermediate out, “Superior 
Offers or Intervening Events,” would still permit the board to act 
consistently with its Revlon duties during the preclosing period.  
 In the context of non-Revlon deals, the board’s continuing duties 
during the preclosing period take on a different light. As we have 
seen with the Corn Products-Bunge and Zygo-ESI deals, a primary 
concern of boards negotiating such a transaction are events trigger-
ing an adverse change in stock prices.260 This concern is applicable 
not only in a non-Revlon deal but also in a Revlon deal that includes 
any amount of stock as consideration. However, in such instances, 
boards expect that stock prices will fluctuate generally. Boards are 
typically in a better position presigning to structure the transaction 
and adopt a specific framework, such as using price collars paired 
with walk-away rights, to deal with these fluctuations. As such, the 
recommendation out may not be the best provision to deal with these 
types of changes to begin with. Thus, a board should be able to agree 
at signing to limit its recommendation out to certain unforeseen
events. 
                                                                                                                    
Superior Proposals (and thus withdraw its recommendation in favor of a Superior Propos-
al), the board should be able to limit its recommendation to other events that are even less 
likely to occur.  
260. See supra Part IV.D. 
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D.   Improving the Narrower Recommendation Out through Staggered 
Termination Fees 
 A critical issue with respect to the recommendation out is the cor-
responding termination fee that may or may not be triggered. As we 
have seen, the receipt of a Superior Offer and the withdrawal of a 
recommendation due to a Superior Offer triggers the payment of a 
termination fee in most cases.261 Therefore, the issue centers on 
whether a recommendation withdrawal for something other than a 
Superior Offer will trigger a termination fee and what that fee should 
be.  
 When an agreement includes the intermediate form of recommen-
dation out, an out for either a “Superior Offer or Intervening Event,” 
generally one termination fee applies whether the board withdraws 
its recommendation due to a Superior Offer or to an Intervening 
Event.262 Moreover, if the agreement includes a broad recommenda-
tion out such that the board may withdraw its recommendation “con-
sistent with its fiduciary duties” then the board may withdraw its 
recommendation for a Superior Offer or for some other event. In such 
a case, the same termination fee typically applies no matter the rea-
son for the withdrawal, if the termination fee becomes payable at 
all.263 As some termination fee provisions are currently worded, it is 
certainly plausible that a board of directors may withdraw its rec-
ommendation for something other than a Superior Offer and not have 
to pay a termination fee. In fact, we saw this exact scenario play out 
in the Corn Products-Bunge deal in which the Corn Products board 
withdrew its recommendation due to changed circumstances but a 
termination fee did not become payable because Corn Products did 
not enter into a definitive agreement with a third party. Instead of 
promoting deal certainty, termination fee triggers like the one in the 
Corn Products agreement, allow a board of directors to change its 
mind for any reason and then argue that it was permitted to with-
draw its recommendation because otherwise it would have breached 
its fiduciary duties.  
 To promote deal certainty, dealmakers should negotiate a stag-
gered termination fee so that a varying fee applies depending on the 
reason why the board is withdrawing its recommendation. A lower 
                                                                                                                    
 261. In these cases, the payment of the termination fee is sometimes conditioned on the 
target company entering into a definitive agreement with a third party making the Supe-
rior Offer or acquisition proposal during a certain period after termination of the agree-
ment. See ABA 2008 Study, supra note 100, at Slide 69 (indicating 7% of deals studied 
provided that third party transaction be consummated after termination of recommenda-
tion). 
262. See Haas, supra note 3, at 20 (stating same termination fee is generally applicable 
to Superior Offer and Intervening Event outs).  
263. See supra Part IV.C.  
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termination fee should be applicable when a board withdraws its rec-
ommendation due to a Superior Offer while a higher termination fee 
should apply if the board withdraws its recommendation for some-
thing other than a Superior Offer. In addition, the fee applicable to 
these “other events” may also be varied so that dealmakers may place 
greater value on certain events. The end result of such a structure 
would be that a lower termination fee would apply to common or ex-
pected events while a higher termination fee would apply to less cer-
tain events. This staggered fee structure provides an incentive to the 
other party who may have bargained for a narrower recommendation 
out and, perhaps more importantly, it incentivizes the board of direc-
tors to withdraw its recommendation only for a reason that the board 
values as being worth more than the termination fee.264 As a result, 
this staggered fee structure encourages deal certainty. 
E.   Interplay between “Back Door” Fiduciary Outs and Narrower 
Recommendation Outs 
 No matter the termination fee and no matter if the deal is subject 
to Revlon or to the lower business judgment standard, the board 
must still comply with its fiduciary duty of disclosure arising under 
both state and federal law. In fact, it is this duty of disclosure that 
many point to as being a reason for narrower recommendation outs 
being invalid.265 For example, Professor Allen has stated that: 
The nature of the recommendation as stating a present view and 
the directors’ duty to make candid disclosures to shareholders 
make this a distinct topic. Obviously, recommendation of a transac-
tion that one in fact no longer believes is in the shareholders’ best 
interest is deeply problematic. Thus, any provision that commits 
the board to recommend the deal at a future time must be accom-
panied by a fiduciary out clause.266
Professor Allen’s statement, however, does not address the inclusion 
of a “back door” fiduciary out, or other provisions explicitly allowing 
for the disclosure of information to stockholders. In his extrajudicial 
statements, Vice Chancellor Strine seems to discount these types of 
provisions as being dishonest. But this raises the question of how the 
disclosure of information can be dishonest if the board is disclosing 
information that it is required to disclose while continuing to recom-
mend the transaction under the terms of the negotiated agreement. 
Under this scenario, the board is being honest with its stockholders 
                                                                                                                    
264. See Haas, supra note 3, at 20 (arguing that higher termination fees would force 
board to decide that “magnitude of the intervening event is greater than the termination 
fee”).  
265. For an example of such an argument, see infra note 267 and text accompanying 
supra note 206. 
 266. Allen, supra note 4, at 658 (emphasis added).  
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and is also complying with the terms of the contract as well as with 
its fiduciary duty of disclosure. The real issue with situations where 
boards may disclose changes in circumstances while continuing to 
recommend a transaction is that it tends to undermine the limited 
out for which the other party negotiated. If such undermining indeed 
occurs then it is simply an inescapable consequence of a board com-
plying with its fiduciary duty of disclosure. 
 The backdoor fiduciary out brings to the forefront another argu-
ment raised by some that stockholders tend to follow the board’s rec-
ommendation so the board should not have the authority to contrac-
tually limit situations in which it can withdraw its recommenda-
tion.267 Proponents of this particular argument contend that even if 
there is a material change of circumstances during the preclosing pe-
riod which raises serious doubts as to the desirability of the merger, 
the stockholders would nonetheless overlook this change of circums-
tances because they would be swayed by the board’s recommenda-
tion.268 However, those who raise this argument do not cite to any au-
thority supporting such a proposition. Such an argument is inconsis-
tent with recent events, including Lear Corp. stockholders voting 
down a proposed merger with a Carl Icahn-led private equity group 
despite the board’s recommendation of the transaction.269 In the case 
of Lear, there were no Superior Offers pending and the board had 
disclosed that the agreement had been amended to reflect an increase 
in merger consideration but the stockholders still voted down the 
proposed deal.270 If a supplemental proxy statement is issued disclos-
ing changed circumstances but the board continues to recommend 
the transaction, it is implausible that the stockholders will view the 
recommendation in a vacuum and fail to take into consideration the 
other disclosures. The more likely outcome when a narrower recom-
mendation out is paired with a back door out is that stockholders dis-
count the board recommendation because they are aware that the 
situations in which the board may withdraw its recommendation are 
limited. In fact, in the Zions Bancorporation-First Security Corpora-
                                                                                                                    
267. See Haas, supra note 3, at 17 (stating “[w]hile parties must look to the contract to 
determine whether a recommendation change gives rise to a termination right, stockhold-
ers will almost always follow the board’s recommendation.”); Stanchfield, supra note 27, at 
1330 (“Any adverse change in the board's recommendation is virtually certain to cause the 
stockholders to reject the merger.”). 
268. For an example of this argument, see supra note 267 and text accompanying supra 
note 206.  
269. See Lear Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Item 1.02 (July 17, 2007) (stating that 
the Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of February 9, 2007, as amended, by and 
among Lear, AREP Car Holdings Corp., and AREP Car Acquisition Corp. did not receive 
an affirmative vote of the stockholders); Lear Corp. (Schedule 14A, Supplement No. 2 to 
Proxy Statement) (July 9, 2007) (containing board recommendation in favor of proposed 
transaction).  
 270. Lear Corp. (Schedule 14A, Supplement No. 2 to Proxy Statement) (July 9, 2007) 
(disclosing increased consideration).  
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tion deal stockholders voted down a transaction after the board is-
sued a supplemental proxy statement disclosing that its investment 
banker had withdrawn its fairness opinion but the company contin-
ued to recommend the transaction. Thus, if the Zions and Lear deals 
are any indication, when presented with information that may con-
flict with the board’s recommendation, most stockholders will likely 
vote their shares not how the board recommends, but in the manner 
the stockholders determine best suits their interests as stockholders. 
Such an outcome is consistent with the efficient capital markets hy-
pothesis which assumes stockholders are making decisions based on 
all of the information publicly available in the market and that such 
publicly available information is incorporated into the stock price. 
Accordingly, the limitation of a recommendation out does not prevent 
an informed stockholder vote. Such an informed vote by the owners of 
a corporation is the closest to deal certainty that parties to a merger 
agreement may achieve under M&A law.    
VI.   CONCLUSION
 In concluding an M&A transaction, a target’s board of directors is 
confronted with two fundamentally antagonistic obligations: the 
board’s fiduciary duty to the corporation and its stockholders on the 
one hand, and the board’s duty to honor the provisions of the merger 
agreement on the other. The tension between these conflicting duties 
ruptures when a target’s board of directors is contractually bound to 
recommend a merger agreement, yet an event occurs after the sign-
ing of that agreement which normally would require the board, in 
honoring its fiduciary duties, to withdraw its earlier recommenda-
tion. To alleviate this tension, merger agreements often include a 
recommendation out allowing the board to withdraw its recommen-
dation under certain circumstances. Whether a board can contrac-
tually limit the situations in which a recommendation out may be 
exercised is an issue that Delaware courts have not yet addressed. 
 This Article argues that a board of directors should have the free-
dom to limit a recommendation out to certain unforeseen events. A 
board that has complied with its fiduciary duties at the time of entry 
into a merger agreement should be aware of most events that could 
reasonably occur during the period between signing and closing and 
may thus address these circumstances in the merger agreement. A 
narrow recommendation out is preferable because it promotes deal 
certainty, which ultimately allows the target board to maximize 
stockholder value. To this end, deal certainty is enhanced when a 
narrow recommendation out is accompanied by a staggered termina-
tion fee. Finally, this Article argues that the inclusion of a “back-
door” fiduciary out with a narrow recommendation out allows the 
board to comply with its fiduciary duty of disclosure while also re-
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maining faithful to the provisions of the merger agreement. This dis-
closure of information will allow target stockholders to reject a mer-
ger agreement that has become repugnant to their interests as stock-
holders. Ultimately, narrow recommendation outs allow the target 
boards to best perform the delicate task of balancing two duties that 
are competing at best and contradictory at worst. 
